Tapol bulletin no, 86, April 1988 by unknown
The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 86 April 1988 
Show trials in East Timor exposed 
Cristi.am Ccsta, an East Timorese woo escaped from East 
Timor last October, has ecposed the trials held in East 
Timor since 1984 as a cynical trick by the Indooesian 
government to create the impression that no political 
prisoners are held there without trial. 
In a lengthy interview with TAPOL (see page 2), he 
described h::>w priscners were told that they would never 
be released unless they agreed to <p on trial. Those who 
agreed were required to sign false confessions to 
provide the necessary 'process-verbale' to enable a 
trial to be staged. Costa himself and many others 
refused to sign. This in fact led to their early 
release, while those who were falsely tried were given 
sentences of several years. 
Cristiano Costa arrived in Lisbon at the end of 
February this year, having passed through Indcnesia, 
Hong Kong and Macau. He immediately went to Geneva 
where he made a statement to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights on 8 March. 
Deceiving the world 
From Costa's inte:rview, it emerges that preparations 
for the trials commenced early in 1984 just when the 
International Red Cross (ICRC) was allowed to resume 
visits to prisoos. As Costa shows, the trials were a 
travesty of justice, deliberately staged to give 
Indcnesia a better ima:Je in the world. It is now much 
easier to understand why so many lists of tried 
prisoners were 'leaked' to the outside world, providing 
Amnesty and others with plenty of information about tie 
names of people tried and the verdicts, though nothing 
ever emerged aboot the trials themselves. Nor was 
Amnesty or the International Com miss Jon of Jurists given 
permission to attend a trial. 
Costa'saccoontalsohighlights the cynical oollowness 
of the prisoner releases that have occurred in Dill 
since last August. According to a recent armouncement. 
fifty-two convicted prisoners were given 'conditional 
releases' in Dili in February this year. This followed 
releases of twenty-four prisoners in August 1987, 
twency in October and eighteen in December, all of whom 
had se:rved between two and six years. InCbnesia now 
claims that only ele11en convicted prisoners are still 
being held in Dill [Antara, 19 February 1988]. 
The same report claims that Dili Prison is the sole 
prison for the country, with a second prison now uooer 
construction in Maliana. (There are in fact two prisons 
in Dill, Comarca and Becora.) This ccnceals the fact 
that most pecple arrested for political reasons are held 
- and often brutally maltreated - in district and sub-
district military commands, and may never be brought to 
Dill for so-called trials. * 
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Timorese refugee talks about the trials 
Cristiano Costa lived with his parents in Baucau until the town was invaded by Indonesian troops two days after Oili 
was captured. He fled to the mountains and spent the following years in the bush. From 1979 until October 1987, he 
lived in Indonesian-occupied Baucau, often in detention or in danger of arrest. In October 1987, he escaped from 
Indonesia while on a visit to Jakarta. After a short stay in Macau, he reached Lisbon in late February and went to 
Genevatotestifybeforethe UN Human Rights Commission on 8 March. He was interviewed by TA POL while in Geneva. 
• 
• 
• 
Cristiano Costa relaxing at the Palais des Nations, 
Geneva 
Can you ecplain the circumstances of your arrest in 
1983? 
Some months before my arrest. negotiations had been 
held between the Ind::>nesian government and Fretilin 
guerrillas. The negotiations and the ceasefire that 
followed did not lead to an agreement and the woole 
process worked in Fretilin's favour. 
In Fret:ilin's favour? 
Yes, because during the ceasefire, the guerrillas were 
able to use the greater freedom to enter the towns in 
order to strengthen their links with the towns occupied 
by Ind::>nesia. This made it possible for a counte~attack 
to be laurx::hed by F retilin gtErrillas in the towns. The 
counte~attack, which resulted in many casualties on the 
Iooonesian side, took plaoo on the night of 8 August 
1983 in K raras regicn, a village near the district 
capital of Vikeke. 
The att.rk was lamched by Timorese in the Indonesian 
militia, armed by the Indonesians, who had remained 
loyal to Fretilin. They had been with the Ind::>nesians 
for a long time. The attack did not take the form of a 
battle with firearms. It was a 'cold attack' (serangan 
dingin), killing the Indonesian soldiers with knives, 
clubs and otter irnplemmt:s. They seized many Irrlonesian 
weapcns and ammunition and fled into the bush to join up 
with Fretilin. In terms of casualties, this was the 
most serious incident for Wonesia since the beginning 
of the war. Seventeen Indonesian soldiers were killed iil 
K rakas aro others were killed elsewhere too. The dead 
Indonesian were burned by the guerrillas; later their 
:remains wereruriedby~ Indonesians in Baucau Heroes' 
Cemetery. 
The Indonesians then roorrled up many people in the 
towns including me. They suspected me of sympathising 
with Fretilin. I was arrested at 8 pm on 18 August 1983 
in Baocau, my home-town. I was living with my parents. I 
d:i.<i1't have a job at the time, I was just doing odd 
jobs, helping my parents on the land and running a small 
kiosk. My parents are poor peasants • 
The torblre 
I was arrested by the military command in Baucau, 
Kodim-1628. They started interrogating me aroond 
midnight. The man in charge was Captain A. Haryanto, a 
Catholic, assisted by three soldiers. On that first 
night4 I was not tortured. On the seoond night4 they 
started torturing me and that was when I lost my frait 
teeth. They held me on the grrund, face down, and 
trampled so hard on my head that my two frcnt teeth fell 
out and a third one was broken. 
I refused to tell them anything, so on the third 
nigh~ they used electric shock and threats of all 
kmds. I was subjected to some of the worst torture at 
the time. 
What were they trying to find out? 
You should urrlerstand that these soldiers are eager to 
be promoted, so whenever the occasion arises, they rush 
around arresting people, regardless of whether they're 
involved in anything. If they extract the names of 
others from the perscn they are holding, off they go to 
arrest a few more. I got caught because someone who 
mentioned my name. 
They were trying to find out about Fretilin's links, 
but at the same time, they were thinking about their own 
promotion; the more people they arrest and get 
statements from, the better their chances of promotion. 
Where is Hai:yanto now? 
I saw him in 1987 in Vikeke. He had been promoted by 
that time, but when I saw him he was wearing civilian 
clothes, so I don't know whether he was a major or a 
lieutenant-colonel. 
Transfer to Comarca 
The interrogation and torture went on for fourteen 
days till 2 September, when twenty of us were taken to 
Comarca Prison, Dill, with our hands tied behind our 
bac~s. When we arrived at the prison, two rows of 
soldiers were waiting at the entrance; each ate of them 
clubbed and beat us with iron rods as we entered the 
prison. They hit us on the head and back, and kicked us 
as well. 
For the first 24 hours, we were not given any food or 
drink. The first food we got was in the evening of 3 
September. But the food woold not have been enough for a 
chicken. You may find this difficult to believe, but I 
got so little food during this time that for the first 
36 days in Comarca, I never defacated. Some friends 
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didn't defacate for 40 days or more. 
For the next seventeen months, nothing happened at 
all. No-ore was .interrogated. Then on 17 February 1985, 
I was again interrogated. 
Woo runs comarca'? 
The priscn is guarded by the military police but we 
were <Eta.irees of the Red Berets. In Baucau, we had been 
arrested by kodim, but after com.ing to Com area, we were 
harrled over to the Red Berets, the special troc.ps koown 
as 'nanggala', and guarded by the military police. Some 
of us were tried in court and sentenced, while others 
who refused to be tried were released. 
When did you first hear about trials in East Timor? 
As far as I know, the first trials took place .in March 
or April 1984. The first peq>le tried were those thought 
to be directly involved in Fretilin activity, who were 
all given long sentences. Many are now .in prison in 
Cip.inang Prison, Jakarta. 
Did yru know Dom.inggas, the woman who was also tried? 
Yes, I remember when she and four oolleagues, all men, 
were tranferred from Dill kcx:lim to Comarca. She was 
later tried and given five or six years, as I recollect. 
I know she was in Tangerang, Jakarta, but later came 
back to Dill, though I don't know whether she's still in 
prison. 
The trials 
How did the trial preparations begin? 
A lot of us who had no process-verbale were told that 
we were to be interrogated in preparation for a trial. 
In Baucau and in many other place, no process-verbales 
had been produced during the interrogaticns, after we 
were rounded up irrliscrim.inately. Despite the torture, I 
said nothing, so there was no written statement. 
Before be.ing brought to cou~ we were all re-
interrogated, this ti.me by the police though I should 
explain that everything hcrl been fixed beforehand by the 
military. During these interrogations, they tried to 
force us to make false statements which would then be 
used for a trial. 
Were you beaten during these i.nt:errogation? 
No, not this time round, but they used psyctological 
pressure and threats. I still refused to sign anything 
and I did not feel at all afraid. On the second and 
third day as well. I went on being interrogated for 
about a month. Not cnly me but many others as well. 
These interrogations went on for three or foor months. 
Did they present you wfth a written statement to sign? 
Yes, they had something written down which we were 
INTERVIEW 
asked to sign. We were asked whether we wanted to be 
brought to trial. They kept saying that if we refused to 
go en trial, we would never be released. But I refused 
to sign. As I reoolleci4 there were over a hW1dred of us 
be.ing asked to agree to a trial. 
They asked us over and over again, with the result 
that many agreed in the end to be tried. You should 
:remember that befure this, we weren't allowed any fam.Uy 
visits. After that first Red Cross visi~ our families 
were allowed to come to the prison to bring food, but 
they were not allowed to meet us. Supplies from oome 
were extremely important:, as yru can imagine, because we 
were not getting enough food. The clothes we wore were 
all from our families. 
Some of the prisoners who agreed to sign false 
statements were illiterate, people who knew nothing 
about politics. They had no idea what it meant to be 
tried, and they were people who had never had any 
contact with Fretilin. The Indonesians used their 
ignoranc:E to stage the trials. Many of us refused from 
the start to have anything to do with this, so in the 
end we were released without being tried. 
Were you yourself not ~ then? 
No. I went through all the preparations but because I 
refused to sign anything, I was never brought to court. 
Where did these interrogations take place? 
In a building across the road from the cou~ the 
funner tome of a Portuguese football club. We were taken 
there every day from Comarca Priscn for questioning. 
By that ti.me, some prisooers had already been tried 
but a lot of us had no process-verbales. What they did 
was to force a priscner from a particular region to make 
a statement implicating others from the same region. If 
someaie agreed to sign a false statemen~ two witnesses 
were nee<Ed for his trial, so two others had to be foond 
to make false statements about him. Once this had been 
done, all three were tried. So, after A had been tried 
and sentencro on the basis of false statements by B and 
C, B was tried on~ basis of false statements by A arrl 
C, and so on. 
Bow mo::h time elapsed between signing a false statement 
and the trial? 
Sometimes, the trial would begin en the very same day. 
The person would be taken across the road to the court 
and the .trial began later that day. There was a 
prosecutor, a deferx::e lawyer and a judge waiting to do 
their bit in the trial. The prosecutor read out the 
indictmen~ then the prisoner was taken back to the 
prison. 
The trial went on for two or three days, perhaps up to 
a week. On one day the indictmen~ the rext day the 
defence, then a day or two later, the judge would 
deliver the verdict. The whole thing had been fixed in 
_.,. 
A show trial in progress in Dill district 
court. There is hardly a sool present apart 
from the defendant and officials of the 
court. Asia week. 2 August 1985. 
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advance by the military. The prosecutor would ask for, 
say, ten years: the defence lawyer would say this was 
too lalg and the judge would pass a sentence somewhere 
in between, according to what had been fixed by the 
military. No-one was a<XIUitted, no-one rejected the 
verdicts ald nothing was ever heard about any right of 
appeal. 
Who were the defence lawyers? 
Two women lawyers from K upang wh:> came to D lli, paid 
by tle court, for the trial. During the whole time I was 
in Coman:a, mlythese two women were used. I don't know 
their names. [According to a report in the Indonesian 
press several 11ears ago, there were three law11ers, Herri 
D obo, A smah A ch mad and Saartje Seubelan, all from the 
T risula Legal Aid Institute in K upang - not to be 
confused with the L BHs or Legal Aid Institutes that 
function in Jakarta and other cities. B IJ their names, 
thelJ could indeed all be women.] 
Did anyone attend the t.rlals, relatives for instance? 
Because the prisoners were all regarded as political 
prisoners, otrer people were afraid to attend the 
trials. In ore or two cases, where the relatives were in 
Dill., they did attend the trials. Many of those tried 
were from other parts, so the relatives rould not afford 
to come. Other people didn't dare to attend. 
Could the prisoners croose their defence lawyers? 
From start to finish of our detention, no-ooe was able 
to ask for a lawyer. Anyway, there aren't any lawyers in 
Dill, only t:Jx>se two women from Kupang. 
Did the tried prisoners meet the lawyers before the 
trial? 
No, the first time they met was in court. 
Why do you think. the Indonesians devoted so much 
attention to staging these trials? 
As I have explained, I refused to sign anything. 
During ooe c£. these sessioos, an officer, Major Juanis, 
told me that all prisoners had to be tried. No-ooe could 
be released without being tried. He said people abroad 
knew that lots of people had been arrested and it was 
being said that these arrests were indiscriminate. So 
Indooesia wanted to soow that this wasn't true. When I 
heard this, I became all the more determined not to 
collaborate. There were altogether fjfty of us woo 
refused to sign anything so we were not brought to the 
court. We were all released on 23 April 1985. 
How Indonesia tried to clean up its image 
So you were r:eleased much sooner just so that Indonesia 
could claim no-cne was being held without trial? 
Yes, precisely. Those who were tried weren't guilcy of 
anything and didn't have proper statements: yet because 
they signed false confessioos, they were sentenced and 
had to serve their sentences. 
When I and the forty-nine others were released, there 
was a public ceremony in the forerourt of Comarca 
Prison, attended by two delegates from the Intemationa.l 
Red Cross, arrl representatives of the Bishop of Dill, 
the regialal government and the military operations 
command, Kopskam Timtim, which had recently been 
established to take charge of military operations in 
East Timor. One of the Red Cross delegates was a man 
called Alfred; I cbn't rem em her his surname. Just a week 
before we were released, there had been an International 
Red Cross visit to Comarca, which is oow they were 
Indonesian soldiers on operations. This is from a set of 
photos of Irrlonesian soldiers in East Timor just 
received. Others are reproduced on page 6 and page 9. 
aroum to attend the release ceremony. 
Some of the people woo had been tried remained in 
Comarca to serve out their sentences, some with longer 
sentences were sent to Cipinang and Tangerang in 
Jakarta, andsome went to the new Comarca Prison called 
Becora, a newly built prison in east Dili. The old 
Comarca is used for prisoners who are still in the hands 
of the military. Th:>se in Becera are in the hands of the 
justice ministry. With a few excepti.oos, all tried 
prisaiers am m01ed to Becora, or to Cipinang in Jakarta 
for those with longer sentences. Some who are regarded 
as troublesome remain in Comarca. 
Abcut. twency priscnm; were released on 22 August last 
year, and twerr.y more on 19 September, then on 5 or 6 
October, more were released. [See page 1 for the 
official figures.] They were all people woo signed false 
confessioos in 1985. Some were released before serving 
their full sentences, because the Indonesians are so 
eager to project a better image to the world. 
How do yru. assess Iildonesia's decision to begin with the 
policy of ooldinq trials in East Timoa 
This was a new m01Te in East Timor because Inoonesia 
was being strongly attacked abroad for violating human 
rights. Als:>, there have been consultations at the u N 
between Indonesia and Portugal. That's why they are 
releasing people now, before their sentences have been 
served. All these peq>le who signed false confessions. 
I was just more stupid than them ••• 
Why cb you say stupid? 
••• well, because I didn't want to be tried. Maybe, it 
was supposed to be clever to go on trial. But I said 
when I was questioned: Inoonesia claims to be a state 
based on the rule of law and the Pancasila. Are such 
trials in accordance with Pancasila? I asked. If the 
others had stuck to the Pancasila, they would certainly 
___.,. 
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have been released then like me. But they were 
intimidated into believing that they they coold only 
survive if they agreed to be tried. 
The ICJ and Amnescy both wanted to attend trials in East 
Timor, blt.t:teywererrt91a1tedpermission. What do you 
think about this? 
Worldopinicn has lrng regarded Indonesia as the worst 
violator of human rights in South East Asia. But 
Indonesia refuses to allow foreign observers to visit 
East Timor. I think Indonesia should be pressed to give 
access to East Timor. The rnly people they allow in are 
friemly parliamentarians from Australia, or the 
Canadian parliamentary delegation last year. Or the 
EASTT/MOR 
German television crew that ca111c 1ast September. 
I was asked to accompany the Germans to a coffee 
factory in Dili. I was working for the Central K UD 
(village cooperatives). But the visit did not take 
place. They were accompanied all the time by security 
personnel in civilian clothing. Timorese are always 
afraid to say anything to foreigners. These foreign 
joumalists leave East Timor and make all kirrls of 
romments. It ama?.es me how they think they can speak for 
the Timorese, yet while in East Timor, they don't speak 
to any Timorese. ~ 
East Timor raised at UN Human Rights 
Commission 
East Timor was raised on many occasions, both by 
government delegations and NGO representatives, at the 
44th session of the UN Human Rights Commission in 
February and March this year. Although no :resolution was 
tabled, the Commission ~d respcnd pa;itively to the 
resolution adopted last August by the Sub-Commission on 
Preventicn of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities which recommended that the Commissioo ''study 
carefully the evoluticn of the sitllation of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in East Timor". [See TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 83, October 1987.) 
The Portl.lguese delegation spoke about East Timor in 
almost every one of its interventioos during the 
commission. Portugal's Minister of State for Foreign 
Affail:s, Durao Barros:> welcomed the Sub-Commission's 
resolution and drew attention to the many interventions 
about East Timor at last year's session of the UN 
Decolonisation Committee in New York, confirming the 
continued violation of numerous human rights in East 
Timor. The intematiooal community, he said, should 
continue to acknowledge East Timor's right to self-
determination: he urged the Commission to continue to 
follow developm ent:s closely and to ensure that human 
rights are respected in East Timor. 
The Sao Tome delegate devoted the major part of his 
address, umer Item 9 on Self-Determination, to East 
Timor. He referred to several statements by Indonesian 
officials, including General Murdani's admission that it 
will stiU take "some time before the threat of armed 
rebellion can be totally eliminated''. He said: 
"At their annual summit meetings, the heads of state 
of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape-Verde and Sao 
Tome and Principe reaffirm their solidarity with the 
struggle of the people of East Timor arrl appeal to 
mmemberstatesofthe UN and tumanitarian organisatioos 
to help in any pog;i.bl.e manner the people of East Timor 
to realise their fundamental right to freeOOm and self-
determination." 
Instructions on how deceive a Secw:icy 
Cowicil delegate 
Pax Romana was one of several NGOs to speak out for 
East Timor, dealing in particular with the methods used 
by Indooesia to prevent the few foreign visitors allowed 
in from seeing the truth about the military presence. It 
quoted from a document of the Indooesian Department of 
Cristiano Carta realing his statement at the UN Buman 
Rights Commission. 
Defen<E in early 1976, listing 37 instructions on row to 
prepare for a visit to East Timor by the UN envoy, 
Vittorio Winspeare Guiccianli, woo was in East Timor 
from 19-26 January 1976 at the request of the Security 
Council. Among these instructions were: 
Inst:ructim No 6: All military fon:=es statiooed in the 
towns must be going on with their work, but they must 
wear civilian clothing so as to make the Delegation 
think that they are unanned civilians. 
Instmction _!o 9: All military elements disguised as 
unarmed civilians must avoid any contact or dialogue 
with the Delegation. 
Inst:ructico No 8: All villages occupied by military 
forces or villages that have been abandcned should not 
srow any sign (weap:>ns, ammunition, documents) that 
could be taken as an indication of their presence in or 
passage through the villages. The roads must be emptied 
of all military material. 
Imt:ructic:n No. 31: To avoid the possibility of 
disagreements among political leadars in the presence of 
the UN delegatioo, the selection of pers::ns to speak 
with the Delegation should be such as to ensure that no-
one will owcse the principle of integratioo with 
Indcnesia. ---.... 
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The document was diawn up cy Colonel Subiyakto of the 
Department of Defence. [Subiyakto, now a major-general, 
is at present governor of the National Defence 
Institute, lemhanas, and deputy assistant for 
intelligence at the Defence Department.] 
A Thini-World colonial power 
Tl"e Women's International.League for Pecce and Freedom 
made a submission, diawing attention to Inoonesia's role 
as a colonial power with two colonial tenitories, West 
Papua and Fast Timor. After describing brlefly the 
histoiy of the annexation of these two teIIitorles, the 
WIT.PF called on the Comm.is;ion: 
- to keep Fast Timor on its agenda until the ca.mtry has 
won its irdependence, 
- to take the necessary steps to inrorporate West Papua 
cnto the agenda of the UN Deoolonisation Committee, 
- to consider on its own agenda the human rights 
situation in West Papia, and 
- to request of the Indonesian Government that free 
acoesg be allowed into both countries to ensure that 
human rights can be kept under close scrutiny. 
F.ast Ti.mo:rese addree;es the Commission 
Cristiano Costa, an East Timorese who escaped from 
Fast Timor late last year, arrived in Geneva just in 
time to address the Commission during the clcsing week. 
His statement, describing his own experiences as a 
victim of human rights abuse, was closely followed by 
those attending the sessioo. In ronclusion, he said: 
''I want to end with one of my most innermost tl'Dughts. 
One day in 1983 when I was being badly torb.lred, I swore 
to myself that a time wa.tld come when I would get out of 
Fast Timor and tell the United Nations about my 
experiences and the sufferings of my people. Today my 
dream has come true. May I tharl< yoo for letting me make 
this statement, And may I beg yoo to take action to 
protect my family from any reprisals by the Inoonesians 
becal.l9e of my presence here." [Turn to page 2 for an 
interview of Cristiano Costa.] 
Japan's Radio Monitoring Project aimed 
at Radio Mau.here? 
In 1986/87, the Japanese Government provided 2,640 
million yen (aboot $22 million) for a Radio Monitoring 
Project: the funding was doubled to 5, 710 million yen 
(about $48.4 million) in 1987 /88. During the first phase 
of the project, 21 monitoring stations were built, but 
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund in Tokyo has 
refused to publicise the locatioo of the stations. It is 
known, however, that one is located in K upang, West 
Timor, close to the border with East Tirnor. 
The monitoring stations are used to trace radio 
transmitoIS, and rerord and analyse their frequency, 
strength and locatioo. At least one is partly-mobile, a 
kind of 'monitoring car'. 
Japanese groups that support East Timor fear the 
project may be being used to help the Indonesian army 
monitor and destroy Fretilin's Radio Maubere. 
Fretilin representative, Roque Rodrigues, said in 
Japan last year that Indooesia often tried to jam Radio 
Maubere: wren the area of transmission was disrovered, 
the air force carried oot bombing raids. Tokyo's refusal 
to publicise monitoring station locations reinforces 
suspicions that the project is supporting military 
operations in East Timor and should be abandoned. 
UN Human Rights Commission 
tnrns W anancli down 
Indonesia's attempt toget Yusuf Wanandi, Executive 
Director of the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, elected mto the UN Sub-
Commission on Preventioo of Discrimination and 
Protecticn of Minorities, turned into a fiasco when 
he polled the lowest number of votes. 
The UN Sub-Commission is oomposed of experts 
proE090d by g01Temment:s woo are suppa;ed to functioo 
independently of their governments. The Sub-
Commission came up for re-election at this year's 
meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights. 
Because eight Asian countries were contesting the 
five Asian seats on the Sub-Commission, there were 
three rourrls of voting: all elected members must 
obtain at least fifty per cent of the votes from the 
forcy--t:hree mamber states on tha Commission. W anandi 
obtained ooly ten votes in the first round, lower 
than the other seven: China, Japan, India and the 
Philippines all obtained sufficient votes. In the 
secx:nd round, W anandi obtained ml y ooe vote, and in 
the third round he got two votes. The fifth Asian 
seat went to Jordan. 
W anandi's chances of getting on to the Sub-
Commissioo were severely damaged by information 
circulating among delegates exposing his role as 
Executive Director of the CSIS, in manipulating the 
cover-up of information about conditions in East 
Timor, in particular the human rights violations. 
T.nxJps of Kostrad's IInd Infantry 
Division. receiving instructions at their 
barracks in Baucau, before going into 
battle. September 1987. 
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Top bureaucrat gets a new job 
Lieutenant-General (ret'd) &tdharmooo who was installed 
as Indonesia's new vice-president on 10 March has been 
priming himself for the job for some time. Last year he 
went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, a 'must' for senior 
officials in Suharto's close circle. Months before his 
appointm~ local leaders of Golkar, the party chaired 
by Sudharmooo, were hinting that 'Pak Dhar' would soon 
get a higher post. In the weeks preceding the recent 
session of the MP R, the upper chamber, it became obvious 
that &tdharmooo had been crosen by Suharto as his deputy 
for the next five years. 
Biodata of a loyalist 
Being a Javanese traditionalist, 12 March has special 
significance for Sudharmono. It was his date of birth 61 
years arp, arrl on that day in 1966, he drew up the order 
banning the Indonesian Commtmist Party. It was also the 
day he took office this year as Vice-President. 
He became an orphan at an early age and was brought up 
by an uncle in Jombang, East Java. Smrtly after the 
Japanese overran Indooesia in 1942, he and Ali Said, now 
also a retired lieutenant-general and Chairman of the 
Supreme Court, joined Seinenden, a para-military :youth 
organisatioo. The two were selected for further training 
in Jakarta. Indeed, most of Suharto's present-day 
accomplices were collaborators under the Japanese. 
Sudharmono has much to hide about the late 1940s. For 
most, even a hint cf. leftwing antecedents, however far 
back, has meant dismissal, detention or even death. 
Although Sudharmono says only that he was in the 
Rorgrplawe Divisioo of General Djatikusumo, a Javanese 
prlnoe, re is remembered by many as a member of Pesindo, 
the Incbnesian Socialist Youth, precursor of Pemuda 
Rakyat, the :youth organisation banned in 1966 aloog with 
the PKI. He was also in the Biro Perdjuangan, the body 
set up in 1946 by the leftwing Defence Minister, Amir 
Syarifuddin, to bring together all youth militias. All 
this has long since been forgiven and forgotten by 
Suharto. 
In the 1950s, Sudharmono entered the Military Law 
Academy and after graduating in 1962, worked as an army 
pra;ecutor in Medan. He later attended Seskoad, the Army 
Staff and Command School. He moved up gradually in the 
bureaucracy am in 1966 was app:>int:ed cabinet Secretary 
and Secretary of the Economic Stabilisation Agency by 
Suharto. In 1973, he became Minister/Secretary of State, 
the top civil service position, where he remained until 
becoming Vice-President. 
A position of great power 
SOOharmmo has often been described as the second most 
powerful man after Suharto. As State Secretary and 
executor of Presidential Decree 4A, his approval was 
needed for all projects worth more than R p. 500 million 
(about El66 million). After his appointment to chair 
~GeomUSWhannono, ri~ with his sucoessor 
as State Secretary, Major-General Murdiono. 
Golkar in 1983, he became the country's leading 
politician. It fell to him to re-organise and rejuvenate 
Golkar, whilecommamet-in-chief General Benny Murdani 
was doing the same in the armed forces. Golkar was 
transformed from a loa;ely-federated mish-mash of army-
led organisations into a party with a centralised 
leadership. Yamger officers came mto the board, in 
place of older generals like Suhardiman and Amir 
Murtono, former pillars of Golkar. 
Notbychaoce has Sudharmooo's name been mentioned as 
a likely successor of Suharto, th>ugh most Ind:>nesia 
watchers discount the idea. As an officer with 
experience only in the bureaucracy, he is seen by 
active-duty soldiers as an outsider. The army would 
never allow such a man to become head of state and thus 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. 
A soft demotion 
Wren Golkar anrn.mced several months ago that it would 
nominate Suharto for a fifth term, Suharto said that if 
he was no lmger able to continue as president, he would 
step down. Some took this as a divine signal from the 
ruler that he would not complete the term, conferring 
far greater significance on the choice of vice-president 
who, according to t:re Constitution, would take over. It 
would not then be difficult for Sudharmono to be elected 
as president in 1993. 
But this is hardly likely to work with Sudharmono. The 
present changes are typical of Suharto's habit of 
___,. 
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switching people ra.url, sensing that both SUdharmooo arrl 
Murdani need to be found new positioos. The vice-
presidency, until oow largely decorative, could be a 
time of relaxation for SUdharmooo, as compared with the 
last two hectic decades. 
In fact. Suharto is now pushing ahead with a well-
planned regeneration, replacing the Murdani/Sucharmono 
duo with a younger duo composed of Try as C-in-C, and 
Major-General Murdiono, Cabinet Secretary since 1983, 
who ha-; now taken over as Minister/State Secretary, the 
position vacated by SUdharmooo. 
Suharto's remarks about stepping down smuld not be 
taken too serirusly. Trere are no signs that the ruler's 
stamina is flagging. A comparison between Suharto and 
Franco seems more appropriate. Even on his deathbed, 
Franco cootinued to rule fascist Spain. In any case, the 
idea that the vice-presidency might be the stepping-
stom to the top was scotched when Suharto vowed during 
his installation that he would serve to the end of his 
fifth term. Only a fatal accident can take SudharmC110 to 
the top and even then, would the armed forces allow this 
to happen? 
Signs of a Golkar-Armed Forces rift 
A serious incident marred the MPR, immediately after 
Suharto was voted president. Brigadier-General Ibrahim 
Saleh of the armed forces fraction rushed to the podium, 
grabbed the microphme and started complainirig about 
rumours surrounding the oomination for vice-president. 
After completing only the first sentence of his speech, 
Saleh was led away, but he still had time to shout: "We 
all agree about the president. But both candidates for 
the vice-presidency are ooubtful. We must find someone 
who's really suitable." (In acliition to Sudharmroo, John 
Naro, the chairman of the Muslim party, PPP, offered 
himself as a candidate but withdrew at the last minute.) 
Saleh is a senior officer at the South SUmatra 
military command, a lecturer at Seskoad and a candidate 
for the post of governor of South Sumatra. 
It is not conceivable that he was acting alone. More 
likely, he is the roe who lost (or won?) when lots were 
drawn fur this show of discontent. The swift reaction 
from the flcor by Murdani and Sutrisno only strengthens 
the impression that the incident was stage-managed. 
Reports that he might be disciplined seemed to vanish 
when he made a joint appearance with Murdani at the 
inauguration party for Suharto and Sudharmono. 
The armed furoes had mcrleitclear during the MPR that 
they would not "propose" Sudharmono as candidate but 
only "supported'' his candidacy. In the drab uniformity 
of Ind'.>nesian politics, the difference between proposing 
and supporting can mean the difference between heaven 
and earth. 
Sudharmono's early flirtation with leftwing ideas is 
not likely to improve his standing with the officer 
corps. His many posts in the bureaucracy are likely to 
be filled by younger men. If &:>, as Vice President, he 
will be mu:::h less power.Eu!. Sarwono, Golkar's Secretary-
General, could hardly conceal his impatience for 
Sudharmono to go. His tasks in his new post depend 
entirely on Suharto; the experiences of his 
predecessors, the Sultan of Jogja, Adam Malik and 
General Oemar, do not augur well. They were mere 
adornments, opening buildings and launching ships. 
Perhaps sensing such a fate, Sudharmono pleaded, in 
his speech of acceptance, for a position of greater 
stature but, as with everything else in Indooesian 
politics today, it all depends on the great leader 
himself. ~ 
The two generals, Murdani and Try 
8 
Seated: General Try Sutrisno, right, and General Edi 
Sudradjat. Starxling: the armed forces general staff with 
Lie~General Sahala Rajagukguk in the middle. 
IC. ompas, 24 February 1988 
The anrn.mcementby General Bamy Mw:dani on 10 February 
that he wa.ll.dbereplaoedasarmedforces commander-in-
chief at tha beginning of March by army chief-of-staff, 
General Try SUtrlsno, came as a surprise, preceding by 
several weeks the cabinet changes that Suharto would 
announce after his own re-electioo as president. 
A few months earlier, Suharto had prolonged Murdani's 
active service by one year when he reached retirement 
age (55) in September 1987. The transfer from Murdani to 
Try was advanced to 27 February, two days before the MPR 
session began. The tmusual timing of this transfer set 
the rumour mills working in Jakarta. Was this the 
downfall of Murdani, or did Suharto need him to be free 
for other things before the MP R began? 
How is Try's period as oommander-in-chief likely to 
compare with the Murdani era? 
The Murdani era 
No-one will deny that Murdani's term as C-in-C, from 
March 1983 till February 1988, stands out in contrast to 
all of his predecessors. His main job was to overhaul 
the armed fon:::es (ABRJ) structu~ slimming d'.>wn the 
territorial commands from sixteen to ten and shortening 
the lines of command. As one of the 'bridging 
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generation', it fell to him to preside over the transfer 
of the ABRI leadership from the 1945 generation to 
officers wto gra:lnated from the Akademi Mlliter Nasional 
(AMN) whichcpenedinl957. Healsohadtotrim ABRI's 
budget and r.id it of its top-heavy structure. Of the two 
hurdred active generals in 1983, only seventy now 
remain. [See also a profile of Murdani, at the start of 
his term, in TAPOL Bullet:h\ No 57, May 1983.) 
He will no doubt go down in history as the man who 
professionalised the armed forces, arming the troops 
w.ithmodemequipmmtwhile criticising the US army with 
its ever burgeoning budget. Indeed, there is not much 
admiration in the Incbnesian army for the US army, an 
army which has lost two wars in Asia. The likes of 
Murdani are far more impressed by the armies of Vietnam 
and Israel. 
Murdani's name will also be linked with the extra-
judicial killings in 1983-84, the Tanjung Priok massacre 
in September 1984 arrl the orrgaing repression of Muslim 
activists by the security command, Kcpkamtib, of which 
he is (still) commander. Next to all this, he has been 
in charge of Bais, the intelligence agency, and has 
chaired the Development Team for East Timor. 
Murdani' s career has long been close! y associated with 
Suharto. From the time he parachuted as a young 
l.ieutenantinto West New Guinea in 1962, followed by his 
clandestine intelligence work with Ali Murtopo in 
Bangkok in 1964 and his preparations fur the East Timor 
invasion in 1975, he has operated urrl.er Suharto's direct 
command It has been a harmonious, 'bapak-anakbuah' 
relationship, true to Javanese tradition: impeccable 
loyalty from Murdani, and everything a serving officer 
could wish from Suharto. As a parting gift, Suharto 
POLITICS 
a move to make it up. 
Still worse have been his escapades with Papua New 
Guinean politicians, particularly the revelation last 
year that he gave $139,000 to Ted Diro when he was 
acting foreign minister in the W ingti g:>vemment, 
apparent! y as a contribution to his election furrl.s. When 
the news broke, Murdani strenuously denied it, but in 
January, when Prime Minister Wingti. was in Jakarta, 
Murdcni admitted that the money had been paid. Suharto 
even backErl him up, telling Wingti. that "it was purely a 
private affair between the two of them and did not 
involvethegovemmentor armedfbrces of Indonesia". It 
was, said Suharto, "roly an arrangement between two 
irrl.ividuals ..• and did not compromise Indonesia's 
relationship with Papua New Guinea" [Times of PNGt 28 
January - 3 February 1988). Suharto also told Wingtl 
that he had enoruraged Murdani to have "closer dialogue" 
with Indmesia's neighbours. 
Some circles weloomed the transfer to Try as Murdani' s 
downfall, premablrely as it blrns out. . His murderous 
behaviour towards Muslims aroused much hostility. 
Pamphlets cirailated in Jakarta alleging that he was 
'sacked' because of ambition and greed, and claiming 
that he part owns an illegal casino which is operating 
in an island in Jakarta Bay. 
In the event, Murdani went up, not down, and was 
appointed Minister of Defence and Securicy on 21 March. 
He will occupy this post for the next five years, most 
of the time as an active-duty officer; the Soldiers' Law 
Red Beret paraoomman00s arriving 
;.,;;:'..........,.,,........ ....... ,,........ ........................................................................................................................... !!!!!!!11 ........ =,,............,. ................ ========!J at Baucau airport in July 1987. 
pledged, in his opening MPR speech, to build up a 
''formidable modern army", notwithstanding Incbnesia's 
massive foreign debt. 
But Murdanihas creat:Erlquite a few problems as well. 
The e>ctra-jtrlicial killings, the Tanjung Priok massacre 
and the current Muslim trials put Indonesia high up 
among the world's human rights violators again. Murdani 
has often behaved like a shadow foreign minister, much 
to the annoyance of (e>!) Foreign Minister, Mochtar 
Kusumaatmaja. His moves against Australian journalists, 
even refusing entry to Australian pressmen in Reagan's 
party during the state visit to Bali, ca.ised nothing but 
embarrassment. He made the ill-judged decision to back 
Man:os almcst to the last, and shortly before harrl.ing 
over to Try, he visited President Aquiro, apparently in 
adopted in March extends the retirement age of flag 
officers from 55 to 60 years. He takes Oll'er from General 
Poniman who held the position as a retired officer and 
operated very much in the shad:>w of Murdani, the C-in-C. 
It is virblally certain that, under the new 
constellatioo, the roles of Defence Minister and C-in-C 
will be reversed, w:ith Murdani the cbminati.ng figure am 
Try, the C-in-C, primarily overseeing the modernisation 
and professionalisation of the armed fon:es. 
The gentle-faced Try 
General Try Sutrisno is an altogether different kind 
----.. 
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of general. He takes over as c-in-C at the ripe old age 
of 52, far older than any of his predecessors. The 1945 
generation achieved high office already in their 
thirties. Murdani was-50 when he took over, while others 
before him were in their forties or even younger. 
Try's smooth appearance arrl populist image encourage 
some observers to see him as a likely successor to 
Suharto. The Indonesian media has boosted his 'baby-
face' appearance, often referring to him as Cak SU, the 
nickname by which he is known to friends. A closer look 
at his background will soow that he is in the tradition 
of colourless, even powerless, oommanders-in-chief who 
held the post in the decade before Murdani. 
What is most remarkable about Try, a graduate of the 
Army Sch:lol of Engineers, is that he will be the only 
general in tre present leadership who never attended the 
AMN and who has neither infantry or paratroq> training 
and experience. A 11 the others, Sudradja~ Sugiarto, 
Sahala Rajagukguk and Sugito, are paracomman<Ds with 
plenty of combat experience, especially in East Timor. 
Tre man who takes 01Ter from him as army chief-of-staff, 
Eddy Sudradja~ is the type that most Indonesian 
soldiers can regard as "ooe of us". True, Try has sound 
Javanese and Muslim antecedents, but he is hardly the 
man to win the respect of AMN graduates. Trey are more 
likely to see him as an obstacle in the way of AM N 
ascendancy, only a few years older than others in the 
general staff who are eager to get to the top. 
The two C-in-Cs who preceded Murdani were both 
oolourless arrl powerless men, appointed in the aftermath 
of General Sumitro's term when Suharto was caughtoff-
guard by the former's ambitions, reflected so clearly 
during the sbldent unrest of 197 4. First there was 
General Marac:len Panggabean, a Tapanuli general, always 
ill-at-ease with the Javanese generals surrounding him. 
Then came General Jusuf, a Buginese, who held non-
military posts for twelve years before his unexpected 
appointment as C-in-C in March 1978. Jusuf's term was 
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highly deceptive. While he roamed the country, with 
joornalists in tow to soow him being nice to the troOP5 r 
it was his deputy, Admiral Sudomo, ooncu_rrently 
Kopkamtib commander, who actllally ran things at 
headquarters. Some even saw the popular Jusuf at the 
time as a IOSSible crown prince~ yet on leaving~ top 
ABRI pa;~ he was put in charge of the State Auditing 
Agency and expected to grapple with the misuse of state 
funds. 
Try is very much in the tradition of Panggabean and 
Jusuf. His efforts to project himself as a Javanese 
traditionalist (he gave part of his first interview 
after being appointed in Javanese) will not win ov~r 
many officers for whom prowess in the field of battle 1s 
paramount. His koowledge of the Qu'ran may even work 
against him as many senior officers look upon people 
from a pious Muslim background with suspicion. 
But t:re new C-in-C has been known as me of Suharto's 
favoorites for many years. Back in 1972, at the army 
seminar held to discuss "the passing on of the 1945 
values", Try was the spokesman of the younger 
generation being the most senior younger officer 
present. rn' 1974, SUharto made him his persoml adjutant 
for over three years. During this ti.me, re was treated 
like 'ooe of the family', and this became a period for 
establishing a special tie of loyalty to the 'state 
leadership'. 
Try's direct link with Suharto is of special 
importance. None of the other generals at headquarters 
can be expected to ha11e the same sense of loyalty.· While 
they see their loyalty as being to the state and may 
even be t.rcubled by the erorma.is power arrl wealth of the 
First Family, Try is, by cootras~ Suharto's man. 
After serving as Suharto's adjutant, he became chief-
of-staff of Udayana Division (1978-79), encompassing 
East Timor. This was the worst period of hunger and 
devastation for the people of East Timor. Then Try took 
command of the South Sumatra Sriwijaya Division, arrl 
from 1982-85 he was commander of t:He Jakarta Military 
Command, a prestigious post. From there, he took two 
further sb:ps up, becoming assistant AB RI chief-of-staff 
in 1985 and chief-of-staff in 1986. He became a four-
star general in 1987. 
Try's engineering backgramd will serve him in good 
stecrl as the army becomes increasingly involved in the 
transfer of technology. A leading partner in this 
enterprise is British Aeroopace, which is constructing a 
College of Technology in Karangploso, East Java, at a 
cost of E3 million, to train technicians "witl]. the 
necessary backgromd to operate arrl maintain the Rapier 
air-defence missile system being supplied by British 
Aerospace" [BAe News, March 1988). 
Like most generals, Try also chairs a sports 
association, the Badminton Association, the only field 
of sport where Indonesia occasionally excels. {c 
• 
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Suharto's new team 
Sarwono Kusumaat:madja, left. who joins the team, with 
brother Mochtar Kusurnaatmadja, who · 1eaves. 
Jakarta Post, 7 March 1988 
Just as the Bulletin was going to press, Suharto's new 
cabinet was armounced He has maintained the process of 
regeneration, replacing half the former ministers and 
bringing in several new faces. 
The armed forces have kept their position of 
dom.inance, holding a quarter of the seats, including the 
most vital posts. As the new Minister of Defence and 
Security. General Murdani, still an active-duty officer, 
will have enormous powers. Two of his closest allies, 
army chief-of-staff Edi Sudradjat and deputy chief-of-
staff Lieutenant-General Sabala Rajagukguk, hold key 
positions at ABRI headquarters. Murdani's position is 
furtheremancedbythe appo.intmentof General Rudini as 
Minister for the Interior, al ways reserved for a high-
profile general. From 1983 to 1985, Murdani and Rudini 
operatedas the team in charge of reorganising tre armed 
forces; now the team is back .in harness. 
The highly ambitioo.s Major-General Murdiono, formerly 
Cabiret Secretary, has become MinistEr/State Secretary, 
the positioo vacated by Sudharmono. Two senior retired 
generals, Surano and Alamsyah, have been replaced by 
Admiral (ret'd) Suoomo (ex Labour Minister) as Minister-
Coord.inator for Political and Security Affairs, and 
General (ret'd Supardjo Rustam (ex Minister of the 
Interior) as M.inister-Coordinator for People's welfare. 
A few retiredg~rals have re-emerged. General Susilo 
Sldarman, till reoentl y ambassaCbr to w ashington, is now 
M.inister for Post, Tourism, and Telecommunications. The 
fonnerg01Termrof WestSumatra, Major-General Azwar 
Anas has taken over as Minister of Communicatioos. 
The new technocrats 
There has been a major overhaul in the eccnomics 
sector. The Berkeley Mafia is almost entirely out. Among 
tlnse discarded are Ali Wardhana, till now Inoonesia's 
lead.ing spokesman at IGGI meetings, Subroto, the 
Minister of Mining and Energy in charge of OPEC 
negotiatioos, and Trade Minister Rachmat Saleh. Radius 
Prawiro has taken W ardhana's place as Minister-
Coordinator for Financial and E ronomic Affairs, and 
Johan Baptist Sumarl.in has taken over from Radius as 
Minister of Finance. Both men are closely identified 
with the First Family. 
The new Minister fur Energy is Ginandjar K artasasmita, 
seen as a young dynamic figure, the first Japanese 
graduate to hold such a high pest. An array of young 
teclmocrats has been brought in to run the departments 
responsible for boosting economic performance and 
promoting non-oil export commodities. Suharto no doubt 
expects the new team to pave the WCJ!:f towards 'take-off' 
as an industrial power. The new team represents a 
decided shift towards the nationalists am away from the 
pragmatists who are more stron:]lyfavoured by western 
financial instibltions like the World Bank. 
The weary, bumbling Martono has been replaced as 
Transmigratioo Minister by a newcomer, Sugiarto whose 
background is described below. 
Mochtar K usumatrn adja has been replaced as Foreign 
Minister by Ali Alatas, a seasoned diplomat. H~wever 
hard he tried to give Indonesia a higher profile on the 
world stage, the cxXis against Mochtar were too great -
on the one hand, the impossibility of winning the 
diplomatic battle over East Tim or, on the other, trying 
to contend with the foreign policy initiatives of 
Murdani. Alatas will only succeed if he accepts a more 
or less figurehead role. 
Finally, several of the so-called 1966 exponents -
activists in the army-sbldept alliaoce in the early days 
of the Suharto regime - have been brought on to the 
team. Mochtar' s brother, Sarwono has been put in charge 
of regulating the state apparabls, while Akbar Tanjung, 
previously a Muslim sbldent activist, has taken CJl!er 
from Abdul Gafur as Minister for Youth and Sports 
Affairs. J} 
Three-star general takes over 
transmigration 
The pest of M.inisterof Transmigration has been given to 
Lieutenant-General Sugiarto, until now armed forces 
chief-of-staff for social-political affairs. 
This surprise appointment shows Suharto's strong 
comm.itment to the programme which has fourrlered for so 
many years under Martono. As an active-duty senior 
officer, Sugiarto is certain to try to put military 
muscle .into the re-settlement of outlying parts of the 
archipelago. 
His army career sh:>ws him to be a heavy-weight, combat 
officer. After graduating from the Military Academy in 
1960, he fought against several regiooal rebellions. 
Since then. he has oommanded regiooal territorial 
commands arrl later territorial divisions, in Central 
J<Na, Sumatra, Sl!awesi and Irian Jaya (West Papua). 
He is a para-rommanch and held a rommand pcsitioo in 
the Strategic Army Reserve, Kostrad He fought .in East 
Timor during the Seroja operation, in the late 1970s, 
which resulted in quick promotion to oolonel. 
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The Thoughts of Suharto, the Dragon King 
Shcrtly before Suharto's re-election as president for a 
fifth term, a book appeared in the bookshops entitled: 
Butll-butirBOOayaJawct or Gems of Javanese Culture. It 
bears a Javanese sub-title: ''Hanggayuh K asampumaning 
Hurip, Berl>t.rli. Bawaleksana, Ngudi. Sejatining Becik", or 
roughly: "To Achieve Perfection in Life, be Big-Hearted 
and Strive for Eternal Goodness". 
The luxury edition, with a black cover with red 
lettering, makes no mention of the author's name or the 
publisher or even the date of publicatim. Only on 
cpening the book is it revealed that this is the work of 
Indonesia's First Man himself. A modest inscription on 
page one reads: ''I give this to my children as their 
guide in life (pegangan hidup)." 
In a long interview with Suara Pembarum\ Tutut 
Suharto, Suharto's eldest daughter, reveals that since 
herchildhJoddays, 'Pak Harto' has been forrl of reading 
ancient Javanese texts cmtaining moral and educational 
homilies, like Serat Centini, Cipto Hening, Jakalodang, 
Kalatida and the writings of Prince Mangkunegara IV, 
like Wedatama, Wulangreh, Joyoboyo and so on. [We 
apologise for oot being able to enlighten our readers 
about all these works.] 
Launching her father's book, Tutut declared that the 
teachings handed down in the Javanese cultural tradition 
provide the Indonesian people with a Ii.ch treasure. Her 
father, she said glowingly, had systematically reoorded 
these pearls of wisdom since his early youth s:> that his 
notebooks had grown very thick. 
The book was published on 26 December 1987, the 
fortieth wedding anniversary of Pak Harto and Madam 
Tien. The work was completed by Suharto on 13July1983 
or, according to the Javanese calender, on 1Sawal1851, 
Suharto's 64th birthday. This too is a date full of 
symbolism, being his eight::-t:imes-eight (or eight windus) 
birthday. To highlight that significant year, the pcges 
are ad::>med with engravings of the Dragon King, symbol 
of the year 1851. 
The book, it seems, is selling well. A first limited 
editim of one thousand copies is already sold out and a 
secorrl print of five trousand oopies has been produced. 
Alongside the Javanese text is an English translation so 
that "foreigners can urrlerstand the glorious values of 
Indooesian (sic) culture". 
It is oot clear whether Suharto is trying to emulate 
Maoze Dong and his Little Red Book or Moammar Khadaffi 
and his Green Bcok. The gems so far revealed however are 
not brimming with originalicy but consist of general 
truths like "Aja wedi. kangelan, jalaran urip areng dmya 
iku pancen angel" or "Don't be afraid to face 
Suharto in Javanese dress. 
difficulties as life on earth is indeed difficult". But 
we can be certain that his 467 gems will from now on be 
fulsomely quoted by those wanting to curry favour. 
Suharto's eagerness to go down in history alongside 
the Sultans of Java has taken other forms. His fortieth 
wedding anniversary was also the occasion for an 
announcement by The Familythata museum is to be built 
on 19.8 hectares of land, dedicated to glorifying the 
struggle of Pak Harto as the saviour of the state and 
nati.m. It will be krown as Museum Purna Bhakti Pertiwi. 
Adjoininq buildings will house vatious family artifacts 
and a library. The Family has graciously consented to 
finance this projec~ which will, at some future time, 
be "turned over to the people". ~ 
Sabala Rajagukguk promoted again 
Only six mmths after beinq appointed commander of the 
prestigious Army Strategic Command (Kostrad), Major-
General Ad::>lfSahala Rajagukcpkhas again been promoted, 
this time to become deputy armed forces chief-of-staff. 
He was simultaneously raised in rank to lieutenant-
gereral. [See TAPOL B~ No85, February 1988 for a 
profile.] 
His prErlecessor as deputy chief-of-staff, Lieutenant-
General Edi Sldradja~ now becomes chief-of-staff and a 
frur-star geoara1.. The pa;ition of K ostrad oomrnander has 
been filled by Ma.Pr-General Sugito, moving up from his 
previous post as commander of the Jakarta military 
oommand. 
All three officers are red beret officers 
(paracommanoos) with long experience of combat duty in 
East Timor. The promotion of East Timer veterans, 
preferably with a red beret backgrourrl, to the key top 
positions in the army leadership is still the 
predominant trend. J} 
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MUSLIM TRIALS 
More verdicts .. 
and new trials 
• 
Even as the rulers of Indonesia were celebrating Suharto's election to a fifth term as president and proclaiming that 
Indonesia now enjoys unprecedented political stability, the trials of Muslim activists or alleged Muslim activists 
continued without respite. 
The trials in Jakarta reveal more clearly than ever that 
the spectre of the NII (Indonesian Islamic State) exists 
only in the courtrooms and in the fertile imaginations 
of the prosecutors and judges, determined to pass cbwn 
harsh sentences. 
Twelve years for a stndent 
Sarjcno alias Barunalias Muchtar Suroso, a studmt at 
the Karangmalang Teachers' Training College in 
Jogjakarta was sentenced to twelve years by the South 
Jakarta District Court for engaging in subversive 
activities in Central Java since 1983. [See also TA POL 
Bulletin, No85, February 1988]. The prosecutor's verbal 
assault on the acrused went so far as to compare him 
with the government of Iran in promoting its Islamic 
character. 
Sarjooo was accused of organising 'clandestine 
meetings' with Muchliansyah, not yet under arres~ and 
Aos F irdaus (see below), and of delivering 'subversive 
sermons'. The prosecutor was deeply offensive towards 
the defence lawyers, calling them "clowns" who had 
infiltrated the courtroom and were calling for law 
enforoement while ttey themselves manipulate the law. On 
behalf of the defence team, Sri Purwani filed a 
complaint for cx:mtempt of court against the prosecutor, 
Silangit [Jakarta Post, 11 January, and 22 February 
1988.] 
While Sarjono's trial was under way, other cases were 
being heardat the same district court. Altogether eight 
cases have been handled by the court. 
On 17 February, Juremi Adnan alias Aos Firdaus alias 
Maman Syaiful Radunan, a street trader, was sentenced to 
fifteen years. The pros~utorhaddenanded a twenty-year 
sentence, arguing that the defendant had close relations 
with 'hard-liners' like Adah Jaelani, now serving a 20-
year sentence, Opa Mustafaarrl Ules Sudja~ who are both 
servmg 12-year sentmces. [Also see TA POL Bulleti..I\ No. 
85.] He was, in addition, accused of arranging marriages 
beb-leen NII members without due regard for the Marriage 
Law [Jakarta ~ and Suara Pembaruan, 14 Jaruary, 
Surabaya Post; 15 January, and Merdeka, 14 January and 
18 February.] 
Meanwhile, at the same cou~ the seventh and eighth 
NII trials ha11e started with Alimin, 38, and Oskandar 
bin Abdul Rasyid, 39, in the cbck. They are both 
attendants at the parking lot in Pasar Santa, South 
Jakarta. The prosea.itors have charged the two men with 
being members of the Fa'i group of NII, that is to say, 
respmsible for raising funds. The two men are also 
accused of murdering a certain Item. [Merdeka, 18 
January, and Kompas, 15 March.] 
Anotlv::!r defendant named Muzahar Muchtar, has been 
sentenced to ten years by the same co~ but little 
more than this has been reported in the press. 
Four witnesses refuse to testify 
The trial of Tjiptn Aryono alias Ibnu Ichsan was 
thrown into turmoil when four out of five witnesses to 
be heard at one hearing, Juremi Adnan, Sarjono, Sahril 
.. 
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Zakaria and Bambang Suprianto, refused to be sworn in While the Jakarta trials are labelled NII trials, the 
and collectively withdrew with proces-verbales. The trials in Cirebrn, West Java, are brarrled as Jernaah 
defendant woo was being tried by the North Jakarta Islam trials. Press reporting has been very meagre, 
District Court had allegedly attacked the Pailcasila in a mentioning only the initials of the accused and the 
sermon at Asholihin Mosque in 1985, saying that it is ~s passed. As rep:>rted earlier, Luk.man Hakim was 
"ephemeral and applies ccnditionally in certain places, the first to be sentenced, receiving fourteen years. 
meaning that it need not be adhered to". All four Another six, Agus N~ Haris Mansyur, Dadang, Beny 
witnesses have already been sentenced by the South Achmad, Asep Jcxli and Dalis Bw:hanuddin have all been 
Jakarta District Court. Tjipto was found guilty and given nine years. 
given a sentence of seven years. A further eight trials have recently started, of which 
The East Jakarta Distrlcthas also started hearing NII three names are known: Is, 33, is acrused of fund-
cases. The first man is identified only as DAB, 40, a raising, DaiJn, 30, is said to be a liaison officer, arrl 
roof-tile trader, accused of raising funds for NII TR, is said to be in charge of giving guidance to new 
[Merdeka, 4 March]. cadres [Pikiran Rak~ 4 March]. l} 
A letter from Indonesia 
The following is a slightly abridged translation of a letter received from Indonesia, commenting on Indonesia: Nuslims 
on Trial, published by TA POL in April 1987. 
Yoo.r book Inchnesia: Muslims on Trials mCJ11ed me deeply 
because you oomprehend the subject quite well. I am 
fairly familiar with the case of Ir Sanusi who, as you 
say, received two sentences of nineteen and twenty 
years. He is now in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta. 
The witnesses who incriminated Sanusi had been badly 
tortured. The prosecutor interrogated them initially 
without using tortllre but he came under pressure from 
the authorities to produce interrogation reports 
containing oonfessions which had been extracted by 
force. Later in court, the witnesses retracted their 
statements but the judges ignored this. The judges were 
also under pressure from the super-security (original, 
English), krown as Kopkamtib. This makes it very easy 
for the rulers to eliminate their political opponents 
with the help of the Anti-Subversion Law of 1963. 
Originally, the authorities constructed a case against 
Sanusi, setting him up as the 'godfather', the architect 
ofind::>nesia's political troubles. The scheme was shown 
to the other detainees who were told to endorse it. But 
as the events unfolded, it became increasingly difficult 
to stick to the story. Eventually, some cases had to be 
tried separately from Sanusi's, but the case they had 
concocted against him had gone too far to be withdrawn 
so they pressed ahead with the serious charges against 
Sanusi. 
Why Sanusi? 
But why did they focus on Sanusi? He had many social 
contacts. He was a co-founder of the HMI (Muslim 
Students Association) set up in 1947. He was active in 
many Muslim organisatirns and a signatory of the 
Petition-of-SO. He started his career in the foreign 
service and later worked at the ministries of industry 
and public works. He was a cabinet minister in the first 
~ 1965 cabiret arrl a member of parliament and the MP R 
(upper chamber) up to 1977. He wrote frequently in the 
press and elsewhere. 
The charges against him in the first trial were 
fabrications. He was said to have given half a million 
rupiahs (abrut $26~ to pay for the detonators used in 
the BCA bombings, based on statements extracted from 
witnesses by force. He first met Tashrif, the man in 
dlarge of the bombings, cnly a wrek beforeharrl, by which 
time all the preparations had been made. The only one of 
thegrruphe knew well was Basuk.4 with whom he had some 
business connections. 
Yet the prcsecutor demanded the death sentence and the 
court sentenced him to 19 years; the verdict was upheld 
on appeal. As a matter of fa~ the prosecutor was 
almost in tears as he read his summing-up because these 
were not his views -but d~~d on orders from aboVe. He. 
himself originally thought Sanusi would cnly get flbout 
two years. 
The two main charges in Sanusi's second trial, 
conspiracy to assassinate Suharto in Jakarta and trying 
to set up an Islamic State (ND), were dropped for lack 
of evidence. The cnly remaining charge was one about a 
conspiracy to assassinate Suharto in Jogjakarta. The 
witnesses were tortll~ to extract statements alleging 
that Sanusi was the brains behind this so-called 
conspiracy. They all complied, with the exception of 
Mohamad Jabir who died in custody. You translated the 
statement made in court by his nephew, Taqwa, who 
testified that Jabir died under torture. Afterwards 
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Taqwa went into hiding. I think he is row abroad, to 
avoid being detained and tortllred like his uncle. 
The case against Sanusi collapses 
Things went badly wrong for the prosecution in 
Sanusi's first trial because all the witnesses changed 
th:!ir evidence in court. So the prosecution adopted 
different tactics in the secoro trial. A week before the 
trial began, the witresses were allowed home after 
promising not to change their testimony in court. They 
were warned that they would be re-arrested if they 
changed their evidence. The trick worked because they 
were so afraid of being re-arrested and beaten up; 
moreCJ1Ter, Moh. Jabir had been tortllred to death for 
refusing to incriminate Sarrusi. 
Whatcanhuman rights activists do in the face of such 
goings-on? I think people should write to President 
Suharto to warn him that such events will srock world 
opinion and ask him to amnesty all these political 
prisoners and others serving unduly heavy sentences. 
Criticisms of your book 
You wrote that Rahrnat Basuki incriminated Sanus~ this 
is not true. He retracted these statements and said 
Sanusi was not involved in the bombings. In doing so, he 
risked being re-interrogated am tortllred. Fortllnately 
for him, this did not happen. 
It is true that Syarifin Maloko was accused of 
defecting to the security forces who are always trying 
tn sow disrord between treir political opponents. But we 
should stand by the principle of the presumption of 
innocEnce. All the inclications are that Maloko never 
betrayed. He evaded arrest for a year because he was 
protected by his uncle. He is now serving his sentence 
in Cipinang Prison with Sanusi, Basuki and the other 
MUSLIM TRIALS 
Muslim tapols. It was wrong for anyone, in particular 
the Legal Aid Instib.lte, to treat Maloko so unfairly. 
I also think you are wrong to suggest that there is a 
oontradiction between the Javanese arrl the non-Javanese. 
About forty per cent of the people arrested in. Jakarta 
after the Priok massacre were Javanese, along with 
eighty per cEnt of tlnse arrested in Central and East 
Java. In fact, anti-g01Ternment activities are far 
stronger in Central and East Java thm in West Java and 
Jakarta. 
It is a fundamental mistake to pit the Javanese 
against the non-Javanese. Because of the bend of Islam, 
there is no conflict between the ethnic groops. It is 
also wrong to describe the Javanese as 'statistical 
Muslims'; many of those tried in Central and East Java 
were fundamentalists. Y ru should not forget that two of 
our greatest Muslim leaders, H.O.S Tjokroaminoto and 
Kartosuwi:ryo, were Javanese. 
The New Order regime has provoked nationwide 
resistaoce because of the absEnce of democracy, the loss 
of political freecbms, rampant corrupticn, th3 appalling 
ecrnomic corrlitions of the vast majority of people and 
the "security-a~all-costs" obsession of the men in 
power. Muslims are in the forefroot of the resistance, 
along with nationalists. 
I fear that ycur assessment in this respect is the 
result of information from circles who are oot to sow 
disrord between the Javanese and the non-Javanese, in 
the interests of 'divide and rule'. 
I submit these thoughts to help give you a better 
picb.lre in the campaign to seek the release of all 
political prisoners, We need to master the "art and 
science" (orig. Eng.) of struggle because we ronfrrnt 
despots of the East. They long for a good international 
image but ore of their weaknesses is their inability to 
cope with the chronic problems of eoonomic deprivation 
and widespread unemployment. 
Thank you for your attention and help. ~ 
[Name and address withheld to protect the writer.] 
Beautifying Kopkamtib 
Kopkamtib, the Operatirnal Command for the Restoration 
of Security and Order, which has since 1965 served as 
the army's key weapon to repress political opposition, 
is to be changed into a "less ferocious sourrling'' organ 
[Tempo, 19 March 1988). The Command was set up in the 
aftermath of Suharto's seizure of power in 1965 and was 
aimed at eliminating the Communist Party (PKI) and the 
leftwing. It has since been used against other 
opponents, most recently against Muslim activists. 
The new structure was not made public when Suharto 
annamced the composition of his new cabinet on 21 
March, fuelling speculation that conflicts or problems 
have arisen over its composition and leadership. 
Several points have emerged so fan the body will no 
longer be a 'oommand' headErl by a commander, but will be 
a 'coordination body' (badan koordinasi) headed by a 
'chairman'. Its task will no longer be the 'restoration 
of serurity and order' but 'the safeguarding of 
development'. The chairmanship is likely to go to the 
Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior, the 
Minister of Justice or the Minister-Coordinator for 
Political and Security Affairs, all of them posts that 
are held by active-duty or retired officers. Kopkamtib's 
successor agency will also have powers to use the army. 
The armed fon::es oommander will be called upon to order 
the troops into action; in fact, he is likely to be a 
member of the 'badan koordinasi' as well. 
'Safeguarding development' is the term already long in 
use to accuse people of subversi01 under the 1963 Anti-
Subversion Law. With troops at its dispa;al, the change 
in name will oot reduce the rew body's repressive powers 
by one iota. Nor are Kopkamtib's special powers of 
arrest and detention likely to be reduced; these have 
till now been vested in the commander and the special 
regional executors (laksusda) who are the regional 
military commanders. By virtlle of these special powers 
Kopkamtib affia?rs have always stood outside the law and 
there is no reason to believe that the armed forces will 
ever relinquish these powers. 1c 
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Elbowing the Papuans out 
by: Joh P. Rumbiak 
Here's the bad news. The West Papuan natirn is being 
elbowedoutas the result of tre dominatim of newcomers 
from Indonesia - Javanese, Macassarese, Buginese, 
Butonese and others. A bitter realicy has been swamping 
the native inhabitants of West Papua for the past 
twenty-five yea.rs. According to Lucas Karl, writing in 
the Jayapura-based newspaper, Tifa Irian, the reasons 
are: 
1. "The continuous influx of prople from outside Irian 
[West Papua is callErl Irian Jaya in Indrnesia] who are 
taking over the centres of commerce. Native Irianese 
always lose out in the competition because they are 
emotionally unprepared. They are timid, scared and feel 
intimidated whenever they buy and sell things. As a 
result, they easily give up and retreat under the 
pressure of competitioo. They are way behind in all 
respects, even in the most basic human needs, food, 
clothing, a place to sleep, education, health, a home. 
2. "The strategic points in the towns and the 
settlement areas are cbminated by newcomers while tre 
natives are pulling out. Today, hardly any Irianese-
owned facilities like hospitals, stalls, sl'X>ps, 
restaurants and other enterprises are left; one could 
say that trey no lmger exist except for a few official 
residences owned by senior government officials. 
3. "As a result, native children suffer fran 
malnutrition, ill-health and inadequate schooling. 
Irianese are not even able to give their children the 
kirrl of education needed in today's world. They are not 
being properly prepared for the future. These children 
will swell the ranks of tre unemployed, and be of oo use 
to their generation and to development." [Tifa Irian, 20 
November 1987 .] 
Suffering the same fate as Aborigines 
Lucas Karl writes that scientists fear that the 
natives of Irian (the West Papuans) could suffer the 
same fate as the Aborigines in Australia and tre Indians 
in North America. Fears about the obliteration of the 
Papuan nation were expressed by Dr J.V. de Bruijn, a 
Dutch gcwernmentofficial from 1938 to 1962, in his book 
Bet Verdwenen Volk (The Obliterated People). Are these 
forece5ts now coming true? If the rights of the Papuans 
continue to be violated, if their chances of a decent 
education arrl proper health services deteriorate, if the 
mass persecution of villagers suspected of being OPM 
supporters goes on and transmigration from Java is 
stepped up, that will certainly happen. 
Woo is there to make sure that the Papuan nation cbes 
not suffer the same fate as the Aborigines and the 
American Indians? The nro-coloJtial government cannot be 
expected to help for they have no interest in the 
survival of the Papuan nation. On the contrary, the 
obliteration of the Papuans is precisely what they are 
tcyi.ng to bring about. All they care about is how to 
exploit the mineral resources of West Papua in 
Indonesia's national interests. When Incbnesia's 
West Papuan childrm. Starting off at a disadvantage. 
Minister of Mines and Energy, Professor Dr Soebroto, 
visited Irian Jaya last January, he spoke about its rich 
resources being invaluable for Indooesia's economic 
oovelopment. He said that new copper ooposit:s discovered 
in Tembagapura, Irxbnesia's largest copper mine, far 
exceed the deposits in Gunung Biji already being 
exploited [Tifa Irian, 20 January 1988). 
West Papuans are not unaware of this. They know only 
too well that treir lands are being expropriated for 
transmigration by the Indonesian ·.government and the 
armed forces, withrutpropercompensation, that lan:l has 
been seized for plantations, for the Trans-Irian 
highway, for the coostruction of luxury homes and so on. 
Copper, petroleum, natural gas and other minerals have 
been exploited without the Papuans enjoying any of the 
benefits. This is why trey will continue to fight, with 
arms in their hands as well as by appealing to 
international agencies set up to protect the rights of 
the oppressed peoples. 
Th.is has been done most recently at the UN Sub-
Comrnissi.on for the Protection of Minorities and the 
Working Group for Indigenous People, with 
representatives of the West P apuan people present. [See 
"WestPapuaraisedatUN in Geneva", TAPOL Bulletin, No 
83, October 1987 .] But Indonesia's neo-rolonial rulers 
are doing their utmoot to block these efforts, with the 
help of countries friendly to them. Much depends on 
whetrer the agencies that work to defend basic human 
rights have the capacity to sweep aside Inoonesia's 
obstinacy and compel it to halt these inhuman efforts to 
obliterate the West Papuan nation. 
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TRANSMIGRATION 
Transmigration to West Papua 
Fi91res recmtly made public stow that there has been a 
steady influx of transmigrant families from Java, Bali 
and East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) into West Papua, although 
the scale is below the target originally set for the 
current five-year plan (1984-1989). 
Transmigration is the cause of widespread discontent 
among tie peop1e of West Papua whose larrls are seized 
witlnltoompmsation. A Jakarta-based lecturer, himself 
a Papuan, warned in an urusually outspoken interview, 
that "dissatisfaction among native inhabitants in Irian 
Jaya (the Indonesian name for West Papua) about the 
transmigraticn programme often manifests itself in their 
crossing the border in the hope of a better life in 
Paµia New Guire.:i' [John Djopari in Sinar Harapan, 25 May 
1986]. 
Originally West Papua was due to receive a total of 
137 ,000 families or about 685,000 people during the 
period. However, the drastic fall in the price of oil 
plunged Incbnesia into an economic crisis in 1986, 
forcing a sharp cutback in the allocation of funds for 
transmigration. This meant that the re-settlement of 
families in fa~off West Papua, involving far higher 
transportation costs, would be bound to fall. 
Transmigration into West Papua began to occur in 
significant numbers during Indonesia's third Five-Year 
Plan (1979-84), rising from 290 families in 1979/80 and 
2,521 families in 1980/81 to 5,755 families in 1983/84. 
In the next two years, more than 10,000 families 
arrived. By mid-1986, 27,726 families had moved in 
(families consist en average of five perscns), bringing 
the total oftransmigrants since the rod of the 1970s to 
nearly 140,000 [World Bank, Indonesia, Transmigration 
Sector Revie~ October 1986 page 9 and 11]. 
Transmigrants now moving intD 
Y apen Waropen 
Acx:ordirg to a recent amouncement, families have now 
started arriving from Java for the first time in the 
districtof Yapen Waropen, Cendrawasih Bay, making it 
the seventh district in the territory to receive 
transmigrants. During the current financial year, eight 
hurrl.red families are due to come, eventually increasing 
to 2,400, or a total pcpulation increase of 10,000. The 
present p::>pulation of Y apen W arcpen is 52,000 [ Kompas, 
20 February 1988). In all, 100,000 hectares of land have 
been made ready for transmigratioo. By the time all this 
land is fully inhabited by transmigrants, they could 
well out-number the native inhabitants. 
In Timika distri~ which is situation on the south 
coas4 an area of land large enough to accommodate 
23,500 families (possibly in excess of 150,000 hectares) 
was ready for occupation in 1986 even tlnugh cnly a few 
hurrlredfamilies had actually arrived [Pikiran Rakyat, 9 
April 1986). Long before the arrive! of transmigrants, 
the loss of land suffered by local inhabitants is 
substantial. 
West Papua is scheduled to rea:!ive 3, 700 transmigrant 
families during tre current year, of whom 1,650 will be 
sponsored transmigrants, that is to say, fully furrl.ed by 
the g01Ternment. The remaining two ttousand families will 
be med as cheap labour on rrucleus estates in order to 
boost the production and export of cash crops (ibi.dJ. 
world Bank to fund 'swak.arsa' 
trans migrants? 
Since the onset of the economic crisis, a far higher 
proportion of transmigrants going to various parts of 
Indcnesia have been required to fund themselves as so-
called transmigran 'swakarsa' (self-funding or self-
supporting). This is one reason why the number of 
familles movilg to West Papua has fallen. However, 
things could soon change because the governmmt is now 
planning to launch a scheme to provide 'self-funding' 
families with credit amounting to $5,000 per family. The 
former Transmigration Minister, Mart:oro, said the 
government was hoping to obtain furrl.s to finance the 
scheme from the World Bank [Surabaya Post. 27 January 
1988). l 
SUdl a scheme would represent a substantial advance in 
the World Bank's supp::>rt for transmigraticn. By means of 
such subsidies, the World Bank would be turning the 
'self-supporting' transmigrants into sponsored 
transmigrants, a move which could help Jakarta further 
increase the number of people being re-settled each 
year. ~ 
Javanese transmigrants in West Papua 
Suharto shows contempts for shifting 
agriculb.J.ralists 
President Suharto has made clear his contempt for 
shlfti.ng agrirulhlre, the methcrl of farming used by many 
tribal peoples, by blaming it for incurring losses to 
the state. 
On a visit to South K alimantan to inaugurate 27 
'integrated forestry development projects', he implied 
that the practice of shifting agricultural was harmful 
to the preservation of the tropical rain forests 
[Jakarta P<>St4 22 February 1988). Such advice ignores 
the fact that tribal people have practised such methods 
for generatims without causing havoc to the forests. 
Only after their exploitation by so-called 'forest 
develcpers' have millions of hectares of rain forest 
been denuded and mill.ions of hectares destroyed by fire. 
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CENSORSHIP 
-------
Indonesia grants small concession 
to Australian media 
The Joog-drawn-out campngn by A ustrali.an journalists to 
fight the blanket ban that has been imposed on them by 
the Indooesian autmrities since 1986 has recently led 
to acrimooy and bitterness between journalists and the 
Australian Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden~ 
Hayden has consistently refused to protest against 
Jakarta's high-handed rejection of jrurnalists, claiming 
instead that a softly-softly approach towards the 
Suharto regime is the only one that will work. 
He is mw claiming victory for his strategy following 
a decision in Jakarta to lift the two-year ban on the 
Australian Associated Press. The ban was lifted after 
the conclusion of the MPR session. As a resul~ AAP 
jalmalistJames Dallmeyer, who accompanied Haydm on a 
trip tp Jakarta in February and was granted permission 
to stay on fur five weeks, will now be granted a one-
year visa. Dallmeyer was the cnly Australian journalist 
in Jakarta to cover the MPR session. 
This 'concessicn' merely restores the position to that 
of 1986 when AAP was the only Australian news agency 
permitted to have a resident journalist in Jakarta. 
Negotiations by the Australian Broadcasting Commission 
to re-cpen its office in Jakarta have as yet failed to 
produce any results, despite remarks made last year by 
both General Benny Murdani and (then) Foreign Minister 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja that they were not in principle 
opposed to the idea. 
Bill Hayden has for months been virtually on his 
knees, begging the Ihdonesians to allow at least one 
Australian journalist back in. He has been strcngly 
criticised in Australia for kowtowing to Jakarta. He 
rejected applications by journalists to accompany him to 
Jakarta except for those granted permission to enter by 
the authorities in Jakarta. Bruce Loudon of The 
Australian wrote that Indonesia's refusal to allow 
Hayden to pick his own press team "is a diplomatic 
insult. Hayden has bitterly disappointed the media and 
Australia as a whole." [Retranslated from the 
Indonesian, as quoted in Kompas, 7 March 1988]. 
Hayden only made things worse by using his visit to 
Jakarta to launch a scathing attack on Australia 
journalism in general. ''It is a great pity'', he 
declared, "that the Australian media is not able to 
criticise (Inoonesia) properly. The way they carry on is 
provocative and will disrupt the co-operation that now 
being carefully re-built." 
Australian journalists prevented from 
accompanying PNG Prime Minister 
Two Australian jrumalists who applied for permission 
to accompany the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, 
Paias Wingti, on a visit to Incbnesia in January, were 
refused visas by the Indcnesian governmm t. The two men, 
both based in Port Moresby, were Sean Dorney of the 
Australian Broaocasting Commission (ABC) and Ian 
Vallance of the Australian Associated Press (AA P) [Post 
Ca.trier, 15 January 1988). * 
Candid com.m.ents about press freedom. 
Major-General Subiyakto, the spokesman for the armed 
forces fraction in the MPR (upper chamber), told 
journalists attending a special briefing during the 
recent MPR session that present-day conditions in 
Indonesia "are not yet conducive to free<Dm of the 
press''. [Jakarta Post, 9 March 1988]. He accused the 
press of forgetting to maintain "a balance between its 
entrepreneurship and the impact of its publications on 
society". 
Asked why the government had banned a number of 
dailies for technical reas:>ns in the past few months, 
Subiyakto said that ''those technical reasons are 
actually ooly pretexts" (sic!) and that the "real 
reasoos for the bans were the dangeroos impact of the 
publications oo the stability of the nation". [There's 
nothing like an occasional touch of honestlj from the 
rulers!] 
Subiyakto also said that it was a mistake for the 
public to evaluate events at the MPR session "in terms 
of foreign philosophies". He warned people to be careful 
in mooitoring foreign broaocasts. 
Weekly banned 
Vi.sti\ a weekly that has recently been taken over by 
Suryo Paloh, the proprietor of Prioritas, the daily 
banned last July, was ordered not to circulate its third 
issue under the new management and told that its 
publishing permit had been witlrlrawn. 
Vista, a periodical devoted to films, music and 
general entertainmen~ has been appeadng for eighteen 
years. It was taken over by Surya Paloh after earlier 
efforts to launch a new daily called Realitas were 
frustrated by the authorities. He had hoped to resume 
publicaticn of some kind, partly in order to employ the 
staff of 98 people who lost their livelihood with the 
closure of Prioritas. In order to keep the team 
together, he has been paying them seventy per cent of 
their wages for the past seven months. 
The stated reasons for the latest ban are purely 
teclmical and relate to the number of pages produced, 
144 instead of the 86 permitted under the licence, and 
the size of the magazine which was ore centimetre larger 
than specliied in the licence. However, these are only 
pretexts, as Major-General Subiyakto has since 
confirmed. 
The Vista editors were obviously aware of the risks 
they were takirg. By the time they produced the third 
issue, the names of the mem hers of the editorial board, 
all of them from Prioritas, had been left out and 
replaced by a series of dashes. On page four, the column 
entitled Analysis consisted entirely of dots arrl dashes. 
After a whole page of this, the 'article' concluded with 
the words: "Readers, please pray for us and wish us a 
long life." [Tempo, 5 March 1988] * 
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Yet another longter1n PKI prisoner executed 
It was leamt in February that Sukarman, a political 
priscner arrested in July 1968 and sentenced to death in 
May 1976, wase.l!ECUtalon 17 November 1987 in East Java. 
The execution took place at Pamekasan Prison on the 
island of Madura, where he had spent almost twenty 
years, eleven of them since the death sentence was 
passed. He was 68 at the time of his death. 
The execution has not yet been made public in 
Indcnesia. He was in a very poor state of health at the 
ti.me of the execution. 
Sukarmanjo.ined the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 
in the early 1950s and was elected cnto the executive 
board of its East Java Provincial Committee in 1959. He 
joined forces with other PKI and nrn-PKI leaders in 
1968, in an attempt to create an opposition base in 
South Blitar, East Java after the killings and mass 
arrests that followed Suharto's seizure of power in 
October 1965. He was arrested during the army's Trisula 
operation against the base in July 1968. 
He was tried by the Malang district court eight years 
Protestors outside the Indonesian embassy in Paris, 
October 1986 
after his arrest, and fourrl guilty on four charges: 
C011.5piri.ng to overthrow the goverrunent, endeavouring to 
disrupt the government's programme, rebellion against 
thegovemmmt, and subversion. Accordin.g to Irrlonesi~ 
press reports at the time, Sukarman remamed true to his 
political beliefs throughout He "expressed no regrets 
at all". When sentence was passed, he rejected the 
opporb.mity to appeal against tie sentence within seven 
days, saying he did not need any time to decide that he 
would accept the sentence [Kompas, 3 June 1976]. 
He was defended by two lawyers from the Brawijaya 
University Law Centre who had been appointed on his 
behalf by the court. 
In a letter to the British Foreign Secretary on 11 
February, Lord Avebury, Hororary Presidmtof T~POL, 
called on the British Government to protest m the 
strongest terms to the Incbnesian governmmt:- to 
instruct the British relegation to the UN Human Rights 
Commission to register a formal protest against the 
executicn, and to urge the Indonesian g01Ternment not to 
proceed with any more executions. 
Execution of Muslim could follow soon 
Meanwhile, a clemency appeal on behalf of the death-
sentence Muslim prisoner, Abdullah bin Umar, 39, has 
been b.lmed cbwn by the president. Abdullah was given a 
life sentence by the Sleman district court, Jogjakarta 
in February 1985 for alleged involvemmtin the murder 
of a university professor and a sb.ldent and for giving 
sermons that rejected the state ideology, Pancasila. He 
was accused of involvement in tie "Warman group" which 
was held responsible for a series of murders and 
robberies in 1979. He vehemently dmied the charges. He 
has been under arrest since 4 April 1979. 
After being held for some time at w irogunan P risen in 
Jogjakarta, Abdullah was moved to the prism island of 
Nusakambangan because he made "agitaticnal sermons" 
which rnightinfluen:::e other priscners. According to the 
press, Abdullah was due to be executed en Nusakambangan 
in February [ Meroeka, 27 January 1988]. 
Abdullah refused to appeal against his life sentence, 
but the public prosecutor, who had demanded a death 
sentence, appealed to a higher court which raised the 
sentence to death. 
The plea for clemency was lodged not by Abdullah but 
by the public prosecutor, the very same functionary who 
had acted to have the death sentence imposed in the 
first place. Th.is is because the law requires that a 
clemency ples must be lodged before a d:!ath sentence can 
be executed In effect, the prosecutor's clemency plea 
has cleared the way for Abdullah' s execution. 
According toJawa Pa; [4 February), the Jogjakarta 
High Prosecutor's Office armounced that the executicn 
would soon be carried out: a firing &}Uad and a doctor 
to attend the execution had already been appointed 
Editor rei:orts that Umar described one of the murdered 
men, Hasan Bauw, as a close frierrl and insisted that he 
was in another place when the other murder was 
committed. Allegations that he was an 'extremist' figure 
in the Al-Mukmin pesantren (Muslim school) were in 
effect denied by several of the pesantren directors who 
said they had no record of his ever having been a 
sb.ldent or lecb.lrer there. 
Amnesty alarmed at sharp rise in 
number of executions 
Inan UrgentActiooissued on 9 February 1988, Amnesty 
Intematicnal expressed concern that there has been a 
sharp increase in judicial killings in Indcnesia. Since 
1985, there have been 18 executions, fourteen former 
members of the PKI or people allegedly involved in the 
1965 events, two Muslim activists and two men convicted 
of premeditated murder. In the preceding decade from 
1975 to 1985, four executions took place. * 
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ICFTU complains to ILO about Indonesia 
Theintematimal ConfederationofFreeTrade Unions has accordingtotheICFTU, concerns the denial of the right 
lodged a formal complaint with the International Labour to organise in all the public services, which include 
Organisation against the Inbnesian Government regarding edu:::ation and realth care, as well as enterprises partly 
the lack of trade uni.on rights. The ICFTU Secretary- owned by~ state. These include companies q>erating in 
General points out in a letter sent on 15December1987 the steel industry, oil and gas and their sub-
that the organisation has often ecpressed roncern to the contractors, import and export enterprises, as well as 
Indmesian authorities at the restrictions, particularly banks and agricultural estates. Indonesia's 1.5 million 
during a hiqh-level mission to Incbnesia in 1984. teachers are also denied the right to form a trade 
TheICFTU complains about serious limitations on the union. The ICFTU says that more than half the employed 
right to strike, according to a 1963 presidential workers in Indonesia are deprived of the right to 
decisioo prohibiting strikes in 'essential services' establish or join trade unions of their own choosing and 
which includes not ooly g01Ternment departments, to q>erate these organisatioos freely; they are obliged 
railways, harbours, transport, civil avi.ati.oo, radio and to j:>in Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Korpr.i), the 
post, but also state corporations (electricity, gas and government-run civil service union. 
oil supplies, mining, chemical plants, pharmaceuticals, ''In the ICFTU's view," it says, "the compulsory 
sugar.. rubber and tobacco estates). as well as foreign membership of Korpri by all Indonesian public 
companies like Shell, Caltex, Goodyear and Dunlq>. servants ..• constitutes a very serious violation of the 
The most serious violation of trade union rights, principles of freecbm of associatioo." -{'. 
~ 
Prisoners die in transit 
Eight convicted prisc:ners who were being transported by 
ship from Ujung Pandang to Surabaya were found to be 
dead on arrival in the East Java capital. They were in a 
group of 33 prisoners being transferred to Kalisosok 
Prison in Surabaya. The group was being guarded by 
mobile brigade (police) troops and had set out on 12 
February, arriving in Surabaya on 15 February. 
They had been kept in the ship's told which was badly 
01Ter-crowded. Doctors later confirmed that they had died 
from lack of cocyg:>n. Some bodies were found to be 
harrlcuffed. Other bore wounds on their heads and chins 
that may have beE!1 caused by being thrown aboot in the 
hold during high seas. 
According to the prisoo authorities, there were no 
fWlds to reblrn the bodies to Ujung Pandang for burial; 
if relatives did not collect the bodies within three 
days, they would have to be buried locally [ Kompas, 16 
February, and Jawa Pos, 15 February]. ~ 
* * * * * 
Youth organisations still holding out 
Local braoches of two youth organisations that have 
refused to canply with the Societies Law requiring them 
to accept Paocasila as their sole ideology, are under 
constant pressure to dissolve and re-constiblte 
themselves lln<Er new names in defiance of their central 
boards. 
The bran~s of the Gerakan Pemuda Marllaen (Marhaen 
Youth Movement} and the Pelajar Islam !nOOnesia 
(Indoresian Islamic High School Sbldents) in East Java 
have resisted demands of the provincial social and 
political affairs directorate to dismantle their sign-
boards. By persistent cajoling, the authorities are 
trying to get tie branches to disband themselves and 
take cbwn their signboards 'voluntarily', hoping to 
avoid bringing the troops in. 
In Jakarta, the GPM dlairpersoo, Rachmawati Sukarno, 
said it was the government's affair if it did rrt 
rerognise GPM's existence. "The important thing is that 
we ex:i.se' [Tempo, 5 February 1988). 
In Aoeh, the PII branch appeared to be even more 
defiant. More than a week after the provincial 
government had been instructed to 'persuade' the local 
branch todisbarrl, the branch went ahead with a training 
course for 125 members. 
A Muslim intellecblal, Endang Saifuddin Anshari, 
formerly a PP! leader in West Java, called the siblation 
tragic. The PII could not accept Pancasila as its sole 
ideology; it sticks to its opinion that Islam is not 
contrary to Pancasila [Tempo, 5 February]. {' 
Embassy pressure on UPNG bookshop tn 
stop selling TAPOL Bulletin 
The Il'WEsian Embassy in Port Moresby has failed in 
an attempt to have copies ofT APOL Bulletin removed 
from the shelves of the University of Papua New 
Guirea booksoop. The shc:p has been stx::x::king copies 
of the Bulletin for several years. 
According toT APOL sources in Port Moresby, the 
Seoond Secretary of the Embassy, in charge of 
information, exerted pressure on the bookshop 
manager and the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the 
University net to sell TAPOL Bulletin. The Vice-
Chancellor took the last available copy of the 
December 1987 isste to check it out for himself. His 
opinion was that it was ''hard-hitting" but appeared 
to be well-researcred. 
When it seemed that the University might cave in 
roever, because itfeared the Embassy would withdraw 
funds for a Bahasa Indonesia bltor on campus, a 
delegation from the recently~tablished Melanesian 
Solidarity for a Nuclear Free and Independent 
Pacific romplained to the Foreign Minister, Akoka 
Do:4 about Incbnesian interference. The Minister 
said that if the Embassy had any oomplaints, they 
shoold approach the Foreign Department, not the 
University. He sent a messa;ie through the delegation 
to the Vice-Chancellor ''to put T APOL back on the 
shelves". 
Copies of the February 1988 issue, No 85, had just 
arrived and were put out for sale; they sold out 
within hours. 
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Senior official defects from Dili 
Inacio da Houra, poet and writer, a Portuguese by birth, left Dili in December 1987 with a one-month permit to spend 
Christmas with his wife and children in Darwin but he did not return. In February, he visited Geneva, Vienna and 
Lisbon. The following is based on interviews with the Portuguese media and with TAPOL. 
Inacio sided with F retilin before the Indonesiru. 
invas.ion in 1975. He survived the first terrible days in 
Dilibecauseofhis European appearance. His family had 
left for Australia after the turmoil in August 1975. He 
spent 1976 in detention where he witnessed torture and 
maltreatrnen~ trough was not physically tortured because 
he was European. 
Later, when things became tense, or when foreigners 
were due to visit East Timor, he and many others would 
be detained briefly. He decided eventllally to take a job 
with the Indonesian administratioo so as to impress the 
Indonesians and get himself off the blacklist. It 
worked, and he became head of the Taxation Services: 
On the Indcnesian armed forces: 
They have about 20,000 men there, but have suffered 
over 15,000 casualites. The first cemetery was built 
near Dili harbour but it became too small so they set up 
a second one in Santa Cruz. 
The soldiers are tired of so much war ••• They die or 
are mutilated •.. Hany soldiers say: "We come here to die 
while the generals back in Jakarta are living at our 
expence." One has to go to Baucau, the military base 
from where (us-manufactured) planes take off ea ch day to 
bomb Fretilin positions. The bombardments are followed 
by incursions by ground troops but as soon as they leave 
the area, the guerrillas return. 
On foreign visits 
Arrangements are made by the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (C SIS). They check out on people 
whoas/<. to visit East Timar and assess whether they will 
support Indonesia's position. They work out where 
visitors will be allowed to go. The Executive Director, 
Yusuf Wanandi, is in charge and sometimes comes to East 
Tim or himself, ahead of a foreign visit. The other C SIS 
person very much involved is K ristiadi who often 
accompanies foreign visitors everywhere. 
The C SIS also regulates IC RC activities in East Ti mar. 
It plays a key role in international public relations 
work on East Timar. The CSIS is a cover for Bak.in, the 
central intelligence agency. 
I was the interpretor for Anacoreta Coreia, the 
Portuguese HP and travelled everywhere with him. Before 
doing this, I was told by the Indonesians to make sure 
not to translate any anti-Indonesian remarks. He 
travelled quite a bit and met several people, as you can 
see from his report. 
On Nwio Rocha's visit 
In August 1987, I was asked to meet Nuno Rocha, a 
Portuguese journalist, at Dili airport. I was told to 
tell him all his expences would be paid. Obviously he 
was a very "special" visitor! He arrived at 1 pm on the 
Saturday and left the next day. He only met Governor 
Carrascalao and the Bishop, Father Belo. He didn't ask 
to see anyone else and asked no questions about 
Inacio da Mcm:a with Luisa Pereira of the Commission for 
the Rights cL the Maubere People, Lisbon. Retllminq by 
train to Geneva from Vienna, February 1988. 
anything. I know this because I stayed with him all the 
time. He went to the market in Dili but only to buy a 
shirt and a bottle of wine. The report he published 
later in Lisbon is not connected with his visit at all. 
It was probably written beforehand anyway. 
The current sttnation 
A lot of people continue to die due to the war and 
starvation. Agriculture is not exploited, especially in 
the east and Ti morese do not leave their villages for 
fear of falling into the occupiers' hands and being shot 
for collaborating with the guerrillas. Starvation 
affects about 200,000 of the 600,000 Timorese; they are 
forced to eat grass, shrubs and wild fruit. 
On the :cesistanae 
The resistance controls over a hundred villages in the 
east.. .. The Indonesians do not even try to control the 
Baucau-Vil<.el<.e road. In that area, the people say: 
"Indonesia rules till 4 pm, then F retilin takes over." 
It's not just F retilin which is resisting, it's all 
the Timorese. On 12 December 1987, posters appeared 
demanding the withdrawal of the occupiers and making an 
appeal to Portugal. The people also resist by boycotting 
the initiatives of the Javanese. 
On Port:uqal 
Portugal's action has been very slight. There's a lot 
of bitterness in Timar because the Portuguese government 
fled. If they had not fled, the Indonesians would not 
have come in. But a lot of hope is placed on Portugal. 
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Canadian and Dutch MPs say: 
"Human rights is not a problem" 
Fa.reign visits to East Timar have been increasingly used by Jakarta in the past year to deceive world DP_inion about the 
human rights situation there. We tak.e a close.r look. below at two of these visits and compare them with the US State 
Department's 1988 human rights report, a source ha.rdly likely to want to embarrass Indonesia about its record in East 
Timar. 
A team of Camrlian parliamentarians visited East Timor 
on 17-18 November 1988, followed in late January by 
Janssen van Raay, a Dutch member of the European 
Parliament from the Christian Democrats. Both visitors 
rep:>rtedthathumanrightsabuse is no longer a problem. 
The reports were widely publicised in the Indonesian 
press. Janssen van Raay had visited East Timor in 
advance of a resolution to be discussed by tie European 
Parliamentc:x:rrlemninglurnan rights abuses in East Timor 
[Jakarta ~ 29 January 1988]. 
TAPOL has obtained copies of both reports. 
Canadian MPs told about 
"monitoring people's movements'' 
The five Canadian MPs visited Inoonesia before going 
to Dill. and were primarily interested in promoting 
Canadian commercial arrl investment ties with Indooesia. 
On human rights, they said: 
"The delegation asked (the Governor of East Timori 
some very direct questions .•• (on) the validity of the 
allegatioos ... abouthuman rights abuses. The Governor, 
a true diplomat [sic], explained at great length that 
tiere was no real problem: certain groups, especially 
those remote from tie main centres, did not always 
understand tie reasons for certain laws [a curious way 
of saying Indonesian laws are rejected]. He did say, 
however that people's movefl\entS were mooitorErl on the 
grourrls that it allowed the government to prevent mobs 
surging into areas where there was little chance of 
fi..rrling work. [This is a novel way of explaining why 
-=-·- - .-=-. -
many Ti morese are confined to army-patrolled 
resettlements.] In his view, criticisms of the 
govenunent were due to a variecy of misurrlerstandings. 
''In the evening, tie delegation met Dill's priest and 
a Belgian missicnary (who) were able to answer further 
questicns on the reality of human rights in Timor. From 
their responses, this did not seem to be a subject of 
much concern." 
The MPs visited Dili prison where they met 70 
political prisoners and "got the impression that the 
inmates were not particularly [perhaps only slightly?] 
ill-treated. They appeared to be well fed and the 
institution well run, and prison auth:>rities said they 
were entitled to visitors. Obviously a superficial 
impression was all that could be gained, since en top of 
everything else there was the language problem: the 
officials spoke Indonesian and the person providing the 
interpretation spoke English but was n~ properly 
speaking, an interpretor." 
Why do the MPs regard the mcnitoring of people's 
movements as not being a subject of much concern? Did 
they not know that the person "who was not properly 
speaking an interpretor" was almost certainly a security 
officer, making it impossible for any Timorese to talk 
to the visitors about ccnditions. 
In any case, row do the parliamentarians know that the 
people they saw were political prisoners? It is widely 
acknowledged that ~ auth:>rities introduce other 
prisoners or even ncn-prisoners to foreign visitors. 
.. 
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Dutch MEP leaves it all to the ICRC 
The repartof Dutch MEP, Janssen van Raay woo visited 
East Tim or in Jarruary is much the same as a report last 
}'earbyt:re Portucpeseja.tmalist, Nuno Rocha [see TAPOL 
Bulletin No 83, October 1987), primarily a ~e-hash of 
Jakarta's version of events in East Timor smce 1974. 
His only reference to current human rights abuse was 
that ''the International Red Cross has free access to 
prisons where tre East Timarese p d.soners are reld, can 
submitromplaints to the Department of Justice and check 
the result". The only reference in his conclusions to 
present-day human rights abuse was: "T~y there is~ 
evidence of human rights still being violated, but if 
there are, the International Red Cross has sufficient 
possibilities to react properly." 
on security, van Raay claimed that ''there is no 
security problem any more. The last military operation 
was in 1984. Since then, the army stopped hot pursuit 
and mopping up cperations, and Fretilin's presence is 
limited to small gra.ips moving in a mountainous area." 
"During my stay in East Timor, I had no serurity 
escort. I could go wherever I wanted and speak alone 
with whoever I wanted." [Strange to salJ, he mentioned 
no-one at all and offered no quotations of what thelj 
told him.] 
Van Raay failed to SCJ!f that the ICR C has access only 
to two prisons in D ili. It has no access to other 
detentioo and interrogation centres in Dill, in the 
thirteen district capitals and other towns where army 
commands are located. 
State Department sees it differently 
The shallowness and inaccuracy of these reports is 
ecposed by no less a souu::e than the US State Department 
in its Cowrt:ry Reports on Buman Rights Practice for 
1987, published in February this year. 
w hi.le there is no justificatioo for the State 
oepartmert. to :integrate its comments on East Timor into 
the chapter on Indonesia, thus legitimising Jakarta's 
illegal annexation of the country, its oom~ents on 
ccnditioos soow just how remote tie foreign visitors are 
EASTTIMOR 
from understanding the reality of East Timer's plight: 
* "Periodic skirmishes between F retilin guerrillas and 
the army occurred, with unknown but relatively small 
numbers of casmlties on both sides." 
* ''The Government continued to permit selective access 
to the province (sic), primarily through escorted 
diplomatic visits." 
* "Disappearances in East Timor .•• are widely believed 
to be at the hands of security or military authorities 
operating urrl.er special legal provisions exempting them 
from the criminal cc:rle. Reports are often unspecific and 
virtually impossible to confirm as the Government 
rarely, if ever responds to inquiries concerning 
disappearances." 
* "One international human rights graip's reports cite 
torture of suspected rebel sympathisers in East Timar at 
the hands of military forces." 
* "In 1987, the last remaining Timorese held on Atauro 
island for suspected support of F retilin were returned 
to t:reir villages where they remain under the close 
supervision of local authorities." 
* "Judicial warrants for searches are required except 
for cases involving suspected subversion, economic 
cr.imes and corruption. However, forced or surreptitious 
entry by security agencies occurs periodically, 
especially in East Timor." 
* " ... letter mail to and from East Timor is subject to 
official scrutiny. Telephone communication to and from 
East Timor requires special government approval." 
* ''In East Timor, the local Government usually 
autlx>rises public assembly for social and ceremonial 
evmts and, as long as there is no perceived security 
risk, grants political parties permission to meet 
publicly." [The State Department fails to point out that 
onllJ Indonesian parties are allowed; all East Ti morese 
parties were disbanded after the invasion in 1975.] 
* "'The Govemmmt. ha-; relocated many rural East Timorese 
living in the central and eastern parts of the province 
since 1979 to isolate them from Fretilin rebels and, 
acoording to the Government, to facilitate their access 
to health, education, and otrer government services. 
Most Timorese require permissiat to trave 1 outside t:reir 
home districts (kecamatan). In someiareas of East Timor 
residmts may not farm beyond their immediate village 
area, and are restricta:l to their village it!self during 
military operations in the area." {c 
__ ...,.,...,....,....rt1rt1~~~~~~~~tt~~~~~~~~~~~tt 
East Timorese students in danger 
East Timorese stu:1ents in Jakarta and elsewoore in Java 
are facing growing threats from the security forces who 
are worrled that living in Java gives them easier access 
to the outside world. 
According to the Students' Secret Com!llission, the 
security forces plan to eliminate all Fretilin and UDT 
activists. Two students, one in Semarang and one in 
Jogjakarta, have already met their deaths under sinister 
circumstances. In May 1987, Acacio from Los Palos, a 
sb.ldent at the Agricultural Institute in Semarang, was 
found dead in a well, having been poisooed with gas. 
"Street accidene' in Jogjakarta 
The secorrl. sb.ldent to die was Antonio Moniz da Silv~ 
astll<Entat the Fccultyof Cocperative Economics, IKIP, 
Jogjakarta. The circumstances of his dea~ are set out 
in a cbcument received in February this year. 
Moniz fought with Fretilin in the bush from 1975. 
After surrendering in 1979, he was smt to continue his 
sbldies in Java in 1981. Replying to a request from the 
gov:ernorof East Timor, Mario Carrascalao, he wrote the 
governor a letter giving his ideas on how to protect the 
eccnomy and culture of the people of East Timor. The 
letter was interrepted by K opskam intelligence and fran 
then on, Moniz was a marked man. 
He was questioned about tlYE! letter in August last year 
by Amanrllin, a security agent from Jakarta, who accused 
him of trying to cause political instability, a charge 
he vicprously denied. He was told he would be questioned 
again. This never happened, but on 15 December 1987 he 
died in hospital, The police told his wife he had been 
involved in an accident when a small girl was run over. 
But tie motor-cycte he ha.d been riding was undamaged and 
the "injured' child was never famd. 
Moniz's wife was not informed of his injuries for 
nearly two lnlrs; by tlYE! time she reached the hospital, 
he could no longer speak and told her nothing before he 
died. 
Later Amaruddincame to Jogjakarta again to warn tre 
other stlldents not to talk to anyone about the death of 
~ir friend. 1c 
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Solidarity groups from Europe 
oonfer in Vienna 
Participants from West Germany and Austria at the 
solidarity meeting in Vieruia. 
East Timor solidarity groups in Europe met in their 
eighth consultative ccnference in Vienna on 12-13 
February this year. The Austrian group which hosted the 
meeting came into e!ldstence only two years ago. Groops 
from Hol..Ja1d, Germany, France, Portugal and the UK were 
present. aloog with a representative of the solidarity 
movement in Japan. 
Inacio da Moura who recently left East Tirnor was 
present and spoke about recent developments. [See 
separate item.] 
Abilio Araujo, head of the Fretilin external 
committee, was present and gave a detailed report about 
the current military arrl political situation in East 
Timor. He said the Irrl::>nesian army launched an offensive 
in October 1987 buts uffered casualties as the result of 
many Fretilin attacks. Fretilin also suffered some 
casualties. He described the present military situatloo 
in East Tirnor as a "stalemate". The resistance cannot be 
defeated, but nor can F retllin defeat the Indonesian 
army on the field of battle. Much therefore depends on 
working for a diplomatic solution. 
Jakarta is now trying hard to smash communications 
between East Timor and the outside world which have 
enabled so moch information to penetrate the Indonesian 
blockade of East Timor. After the international outcry 
wl'en fulr Tiomorese students were prevented from leaving 
Jakarta for Portugal in 1986, he said the authorities 
were oow resorting to murdering students in order to 
stifle contacts with abroad. 
The meeting discussed coordination during 1987 for 
events like the June meeting of the Inter-Governmental 
G.rrup oo Jrrl::re;ia, meetings of the UN human rights sub-
comm ission and Deoolonisatioo Committee, arrl Eurcpean 
Parliament sessions. It was agreed to have joint actions 
in a rumber of European capitals on 7 December which 
will be the thirteenth anniversary of the Indonesian 
invasion of East Tirnor. 
The next conference will take place in January 1989, 
probably in a Scand.ivanian country. ~ 
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